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Are Vietnam and the Philippines trending more toward conflict or cooperation 
with China over disputed territories and resource claims in the South China Sea? This 
thesis investigates realist and liberal international relations theories applied to three states 
involved in South China Sea disputes. It reviews the history of South China Sea disputes 
between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines since 1988 and reviews the states’ growing 
economic interconnectedness to determine whether they have trended toward armed 
conflict or if economic interdependence has led the states toward cooperation to manage 
their overlapping claims. This thesis concludes that China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
have trended neither toward armed conflict nor cooperation to manage their South China 
Sea territory and resource disputes. Despite increasing tensions over the competition for 
territory and resources, the states have managed their disputes peacefully and have 
avoided armed conflict since 1988. Furthermore, despite increasing asymmetric 
economic interdependence between the smaller states and China correlating to the period 
of relative peace in the South China Sea, the states have rarely cooperated with one 
another to manage their disputes. Asymmetric economic interdependence between the 
smaller states and China, however, has contributed to the relative peace in the South 
China Sea. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
There are two prevailing but opposing schools of thought regarding the security 
environment and potential for armed conflict between states with competing territory and 
resource claims in the South China Sea. One school of thought contends that as China 
continues its rise, it will challenge the status quo of the region in an effort to shift the 
international environment in Beijing’s favor.1 As a result, China’s neighbors will view it 
as a threat, respond by balancing against China, and a security dilemma will ensue, thus 
destabilizing the region and increasing the likelihood of armed conflict.2 Those who hold 
this realist perspective point to evidence in China’s aggressive actions to assert 
sovereignty over disputed territories and resource claims in the South China Sea and the 
corresponding reactions by Southeast Asian nations, particularly Vietnam and the 
Philippines.3 
By contrast, the liberal school of thought contends that economic interdependence 
between the states has stabilized the region and reduced the likelihood of armed conflict 
between China and its neighbors.4 Some who hold this liberal perspective point to 
evidence in the growing economic ties between China and its neighbors. These liberals 
believe Vietnam and the Philippines have become so economically dependent on China 
that they are constrained from using force to settle conflicts and instead will favor 
cooperation.5  
                                                 
1 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” in The Realism Reader, ed. Colin Elman and 
Michael Jensen, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 466.  
2 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International 
Security 18, no. 3 (1993-1994), 28. 
3 Ramses Amer, “The South China Sea: Achievements and Challenges to Dispute Management,” 
Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (May/June 2015), 627. 
4 Ming Wan, “Economic Interdependence and Economic Cooperation: Mitigating Conflict and 
Transforming Security Order in Asia,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. 
Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 280; Benjamin E. Goldsmith, “A 
Liberal Peace in Asia?,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007), 5. 
5 Chong-Pin Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions with China: Struggle without 
Breaking,” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 (May/June 2015), 500. 
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These realist and liberal perspectives predict vastly contrasting trends for 
interstate relations over South China Sea disputes. Realists suggest that the states are on 
an increasing trend toward armed conflict to resolve disputes. Liberals predict that states 
are on an increasing trend toward cooperation to manage their disputes. Vietnam and the 
Philippines have demonstrated realist trends of self-strengthening in response to China’s 
growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. Both countries also show evidence of 
becoming more economically dependent on China and favoring cooperation over conflict 
to manage territorial disputes. Assessing which trend is historically dominant may 
provide insight to whether the region is heading toward armed conflict. Are Vietnam and 
the Philippines trending toward conflict or cooperation with China over disputed 
territories and resource claims in the South China Sea? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Armed conflict stemming from territorial disputes in the South China Sea would 
have significant global repercussions. It is estimated that more than half of the globe’s 
shipping trade, one-third of its crude oil, and one-third of its liquefied natural gas transits 
the South China Sea chokepoints.6 Oil transiting the South China Sea powers the giant 
Asian economies that manufacture technology, clothing, and consumer goods flowing 
toward the West.7 Bill Hayton attests that if the flow of shipping through the South China 
Sea were to halt, “it wouldn’t be long before the lights in some parts of the world started 
going out.”8 
Many Southeast Asian experts recognize the tensions between states over 
territorial disputes and competing resource claims in the South China Sea. Mikael 
Weissmann claims, “Today the [South China Sea] is…the most critical flashpoint in the 
                                                 
6 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, (New Haven, CT: Yale 




East Asian region.”9 He identifies that the Spratly and Paracel island groups are the “core 
area of conflict.”10 
As the world’s most powerful naval force and with vital interests in the region, 
the United States is likely to be drawn into an armed conflict over South China Sea 
disputes. Any clash would result in U.S. diplomatic pressure for de-escalation. 
Additionally, a better understanding of whether Vietnam or the Philippines will resort to 
armed conflict to defend their claims against Chinese aggressive assertion of sovereignty 
may help U.S. policymakers defuse potential crises in the region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis will attempt to determine whether Vietnam and the Philippines are 
trending toward conflict or cooperation in managing their competing South China Sea 
territory and resource claims with China. This section reviews literature on realist 
international relations theory, how it has been applied to Southeast Asia, and preliminary 
evidence that supports this realist view. This section then reviews literature on economic 
interdependence, how it has been applied to Southeast Asia, and preliminary evidence 
that supports the liberal perspective on the South China Sea security environment.  
1. ARE SOUTH CHINA SEA STATES TRENDING TOWARD 
ARMED CONFLICT? 
Realists contend that sovereign states compete for power.11 Some argue that this 
competition could lead to a security dilemma and destabilize a region, trending it toward 
a propensity for armed conflict.12 Robert Gilpin attests that rising powers seek prestige 
through territorial gains and by controlling the rules of the international system, and he 
argues that they may challenge the status quo of the system if the potential gains 
                                                 
9 Mikael Weissmann, “The South China Sea: Still No War on the Horizon,” Asian Survey 55, no. 3 
(May/June 2015), 596. 
10 Ibid., 601. 
11 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 186–7. 
12 Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 9, 28. 
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outweigh the costs.13 Aaron Friedberg contends that, as a rising power challenges the 
system, its neighbors may perceive it as a threat.14 As a result, the rising power’s weaker 
neighbors will respond to the perceived threat. Responses could include self-
strengthening or making alliances to balance against the threat and defend their own 
interests.15 As a rising power observes its neighbors increase their defenses, it may 
perceive a threat to its own power and, in turn, increase its defenses.16 The situation may 
evolve into a spiraling security dilemma that destabilizes a region.17 
a.  Conflict between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines  
Some who hold a realist perspective of Asia suggest that the region is trending 
toward armed conflict over competitions for territories and resources.18 Realists have 
argued that, since the Cold War ended, Asia has developed into a multipolar region with 
complex interstate relations.19 Aaron Friedberg contends that as states compete for power 
in such a complex system, there is a greater chance of miscalculation by leaders that 
further destabilizes the region.20 As a counter to liberal views, Friedberg observes that in 
the early to mid-1990s, the economies of Asian countries remained largely independent 
from each other and contends that if economic interdependence truly has pacifying 
effects, they had not reached the whole of Asia.21 Friedberg also points out the political 
friction between states that achieve high levels of interdependence, leading to higher 
potential for rivalry.22 John J. Mearsheimer argues that although China will not likely 
attempt to conquer its neighbors, it will strive for greater regional power and use its 
                                                 
13 Gilpin, War and Change, 186–7. 




18 Ibid., 18; Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” 466–7. 
19 Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 9. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 19. 
22 Ibid., 21. 
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power to challenge the regional status quo in its favor.23 He highlights that, as China 
continues its naval growth, it will present a greater challenge to its neighbors’ with 
overlapping claims to territory and resources in the South China Sea.24 Although they are 
liberals, Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry agree in part with the realist view, 
observing that China’s rapid development combined with the economic growth of the 
region “seems to have created an even more volatile climate and a potentially vicious 
cycle of arming and rearming.”25 
b. Evidence of an Unstable Region Trending toward Armed Conflict 
South China Sea disputes over territorial sovereignty and resource claims 
continue to create tension among China and its neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines. 
China and Vietnam have conflicting claims over the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, 
and the Philippines has overlapping claims with China in the Spratlys and other sizable 
areas of the South China Sea.26 With China’s growing economic strength, it has increased 
its maritime capabilities, used military and maritime law enforcement vessels to assert 
sovereignty over its claims, and attempted to deter its smaller neighbors from extracting 
resources from disputed areas.27 
China’s maritime interests and defense spending have grown with its economic 
expansion and dependency on energy and raw material imports.28 Jingdong Yuan 
contends that China recognizes the need to protect its maritime rights and interests by 
strengthening the capabilities of its navy.29 He highlights China’s naval buildup that 
emphasizes submarines over aircraft carriers, its pursuit of sea-denial capabilities within 
                                                 
23 Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” 466–7. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Towards Tragedy?: China’s Rise, Military 
Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39, no. 2 (2014), 52. 
26 Amer, “South China Sea: Achievements and Challenges,” 627. 
27 Weissmann, “The South China Sea: Still No War,” 603. 
28 Jingdong Yuan, “China and the Indian Ocean: New Departures in Regional Balancing,” in Deep 
Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security, ed. John Garofano and Andrea J. 
Dew (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2013), 157. 
29 Ibid., 166–67. 
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the first island chain and blue water capabilities abroad, and its aims to protect its 
perceived rights to South China Sea resources.30 
As China has grown stronger, it has unilaterally imposed restrictions over portions 
of the South China Sea and modernized its capabilities to influence the Southeast Asian 
international system in its favor. China’s challenges to the status quo have acted as a 
catalyst to South China Sea tensions. In 1999, Beijing began unilaterally imposing a 
fishing ban over the Spratly Islands.31 In 2007, China passed legislation to govern the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands from Hainan.32 China’s modernized maritime capabilities 
enable it to enforce a stronger stance in undermining its neighbors’ territorial claims.33 
China has increased naval and maritime law enforcement patrols near contested areas to 
assert its sovereignty and enforce its restrictions.34  
There are numerous examples of China challenging the status quo over disputed 
territories with Vietnam and the Philippines. In 1994, China began seismographic survey 
operations in Wan An Bei 21 (WAB-21), a Chinese named oil exploration block located 
over 500 nautical miles south of China but within 150 nautical miles of Vietnam’s 
coastline.35 In May of 2011, China used maritime surveillance (CMS) vessels to interfere 
with Vietnamese contracted survey ships operating in disputed waters.36 Two weeks 
later, another Vietnamese contracted oil survey vessel clashed with Chinese fishing boats 
and ships from China’s Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) within Vietnam’s 
claimed EEZ.37 A more recent crisis between China and Vietnam erupted in May 2014 
                                                 
30 Yuan, “China and the Indian Ocean,” 169–70, 172. 
31 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 242. 
32 Weissmann, “South China Sea: Still No War,” 602. 
33 Ibid., 603. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 125. 
36 Clive Schofield et al., “From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to 
Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, Special Report 
#30 (July 2011), 7; Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 145. 
37 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 145–6. 
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when China deployed an oil-drilling rig in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands.38 The 
event resulted in a two-month standoff at sea, violent anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam 
resulting in Chinese casualties, Vietnamese diplomatic pressure on Beijing, and attempts 
to gain international support for Vietnam’s Paracel claims.39  
China’s challenges against the Philippines have been aggressive, as well. In 1995, 
the Philippines’ discovery of Chinese built structures on Mischief Reef caused 
considerable diplomatic uproar.40 In 1998, the Philippines discovered Chinese fishermen 
fishing in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), roughly 100 nautical miles 
east of the Philippines’ main island of Luzon in the disputed Scarborough Shoal.41 
Tensions over Scarborough Shoal flared in April 2012 and resulted in a two-month 
standoff between the states when two Chinese CMS vessels blocked a Philippine Navy 
attempt to arrest Chinese fishermen operating in the disputed area.42 In 2015, Chinese 
Coast Guard ships rammed Philippine fishing vessels in Scarborough Shoal and 
interfered with Philippine resupply of forces occupying Second Thomas Shoal.43 
Realists argue that states in Southeast Asia might respond aggressively to China’s 
assertiveness, resulting in a destabilizing security dilemma in the multipolar region.44 
Self-strengthening efforts of increased defense budgets and the pursuit of modern 
maritime capabilities to counter China’s assertive posturing could indicate destabilizing 
                                                 
38 Ramses Amer, “Vietnam in 2014: Crisis with China Makes Headlines,” Southeast Asian Affairs 
2015, 387–88. 
39 Amer, “Vietnam in 2014: Crisis with China,” 387–88. 
40 David Scott, “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea,” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 
(November/December 2012), 1031, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.6.1019. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Cristina Jayme Montiel et al., “Nationalism in Local Media During International Conflict: Text 
Mining Domestic News Reports of the China-Philippines Maritime Dispute,” Journal of Language and 
Social Psychology 33, no. 5 (October 2014): 446. 
43 Robert Sutter, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Ambitious Economic Initiatives amid Boundary 
Disputes,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (May 
2015), http://csis.org/files/publication/1501qchina_seasia.pdf.  
44 Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” 466–7; Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 9, 18; Michael T. 
Klare, “The Next Great Arms Race,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993), 136. 
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responses by China’s neighbors.45 For instance, Beijing’s defense spending outpaced 
India for the second largest regional budget in 2001 and took the region’s lead from 
Japan in 2005.46  
Vietnam and the Philippines’ defense spending may indicate self-strengthening 
measures and an increasing trend toward regional conflict, as well. Bill Hayton argues 
that the two countries have built up their militaries to protect territorial claims in response 
to China.47 In 2014, Vietnam’s military budget had more than doubled from that of 2005, 
reaching $4.3 billion.48 In 2009, Vietnam purchased six Kilo-class submarines and 
expressed interest in purchasing Su-30MK2 fighter aircraft from Russia to secure its air 
and maritime domains in response to South China Sea disputes with China.49  
In 2011, the Philippines reinvigorated its pursuit of territorial defense capabilities 
in response to China, as well.50 Ernest Bower claims that China’s efforts of territory 
reclamation in disputed areas of the Spratly Islands have bolstered Philippine defense 
spending.51 Additionally, in 2011, the newly elected Benigno Aquino III presidential 
administration sought new ships to replace its aging World War II era fleet and fighter 
aircraft to rebuild its air defense capability and assert sovereignty over disputed territorial 
claims with China.52 
                                                 
45 Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,”18, 29, 31; Weissmann, “South China Sea: Still No War,” 596; Klare, 
“Next Great Arms Race,” 136. 
46 Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Herman, and Sneha Raghavan, “Asian Defense Spending, 2000–2011,” 
A Report of the CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, October 2012, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/121005_Berteau_AsianDefenseSpending_Web.pdf, vi. 
47 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 236–7. 
48 Ernest Z. Bower, “Southeast Asia from Scott Circle,” Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(online newsletter) 6, no. 11 (28 May 2015), http://csis.org/publication/southeast-asia-scott-circle-
enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement-manilas-most-credible. 
49 Liff, “Racing Towards Tragedy?,” 80. 
50 Renato Cruz De Castro, “The Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy against an Emergent 
China: Its Domestic and External Dimensions,” Pacific Affairs 87, no.1 (2014), 6. 
51 Bower, “Southeast Asia from Scott Circle.” 
52 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 236. 
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2. ARE SOUTH CHINA SEA STATES TRENDING TOWARD 
COOPERATION? 
Some liberals attribute peace between modern states to their economic 
interdependence.53 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr. contend that 
interdependence between states has a strong influence on international political processes 
when compared to traditional realist theories.54 They argue that as states become more 
interdependent, the use of military force to resolve political conflict becomes more costly, 
undesirable, and unlikely.55 They describe that interdependence between states can be 
especially strong when it is created through interconnected economies with reciprocating, 
but not necessarily symmetric, “significant costly effects” for both sides if they oppose 
each other in armed conflict.56  
a. Economic Interdependence of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
Some contemporary liberals attribute the lack of armed conflict over territory and 
resource disputes in the South China Sea in recent years to economic interdependence.57 
Those holding this perspective claim that Vietnam and the Philippines have become so 
economically dependent on China that they are restrained from settling disputes with 
military force. Benjamin Goldsmith argues that liberal hopes of economic 
interdependence contributing to peace in Asia have come to fruition.58 Ming Wan claims 
that economic interdependence and cooperation have spread through the Asia Pacific 
region, and, although they may not prevent conflict over territorial disputes, they 
certainly have pacifying effects.59 Chong-Pin Lin claims that despite contentious 
                                                 
53 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. (Boston: Longman, 
2012), 4–5. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Keohane, Power and Interdependence, 23–24. 
56 Ibid., 8. 
57 Goldsmith, “Liberal Peace in Asia?,” 5. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Wan, “Economic Interdependence and Economic Cooperation,” 280. 
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territorial disputes between the states, Vietnam and the Philippines are so economically 
dependent on China that they are restricted from using military force to settle disputes.60  
b. Evidence of Economic Interdependence 
The Vietnam and Philippine economies have grown increasingly dependent on 
China. Vietnam began growing more economically dependent on China during the last 
decade of the 20th century.61 Joseph Y.S. Cheng claims that in 1991, with Vietnam’s 
economy suffering, Hanoi turned toward China as a model for economic reform and to 
open bilateral trade.62 Subsequently, trade between China and Vietnam developed 
quickly, increasing from $32.23 million in 1991 to almost $2.47 billion by the end of the 
20th century.63 China exceeded Japan as Vietnam’s largest trade partner by 2004, and the 
two countries’ trade topped $21 billion by 2009 and was over $63.5 billion by 2014.64 
The Sino-Vietnam trade picture, however, is asymmetric.65 Even with China’s 
foreign trade expanding, in 2013, trade between the two countries was only 0.76 percent 
of China’s total trade, as opposed to 13.6 percent of Vietnam’s trade.66 Furthermore, the 
Vietnamese trade deficit to China has continued to grow.67 The preliminary evidence 
shows economic interdependence but is indicative of Vietnam’s economic dependence on 
China. 
During the first decade of the new millennium, as Sino-Philippine trade began 
growing rapidly, the Philippines grew more economically dependent on China, as well.68 
                                                 
60 Lin, “Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions,” 478. 
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63 Ibid., 385. 
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66 Ibid. 
67 Amer, “Vietnam in 2014: Crisis with China,” 390. 
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Bilateral trade between the Philippines and China grew from $3.1 billion in 2000 to more 
than $27.7 billion by 2010.69 In 2010, Renato Cruz De Castro qualified the Sino-
Philippine economic relationship as, “the fastest-growing bilateral trade in the Southeast 
Asian region.”70 Also in 2010, China became the Philippines’ third-biggest trade partner 
after Japan and the United States.71 Trade between the two states reached nearly 
$23.5 billion by 2014.72 The rapidly growing Sino-Philippine trade relations caused De 
Castro to declare that China had grown vital to the Philippine growth in exports and 
economic expansion.73  
As with the Sino-Vietnam trade relationship, Sino-Philippine trade is very 
asymmetric. In 2013, for example, total bilateral trade between the countries was nearly 
14 percent of the Philippine GDP. By contrast, total bilateral trade during the same year 
was less than 1 percent of China’s GDP. Although the preliminary evidence shows signs 
of an economic interdependent relationship, the asymmetry is more indicative of 
Philippine dependence on China.74 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature review covered two theories that explain regional trends toward 
conflict or cooperation between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. One explanation 
suggests that China’s challenges to the status quo have resulted in balancing responses by 
Vietnam and the Philippines that may lead to a less stable environment and unintended 
armed conflict. The other explanation suggests that the states are becoming economically 
                                                 
69 Calculations based on IMF and World Bank data, http://www.worldbank.org, 
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interdependent and trending toward cooperation rather than conflict, resulting in a more 
stable environment. 
The first explanation contends that China’s growth has increased its willingness to 
challenge the regional status quo, which, in turn, threatens Vietnam and the Philippines 
and destabilizes the region. With China’s economic growth, it has increased its 
capabilities to assert sovereignty over disputed territory and resource claims. China’s 
neighbors, however, view China’s actions as a threat to their sovereignty. As diplomatic 
protests and attempts to gain international support for their claims continually have failed 
to resolve the disputes, Vietnam and the Philippines have turned toward military means to 
deter China’s actions and defend their claims. Thus, the resulting security dilemma may 
lead the region toward instability, and Vietnam and the Philippines may be trending 
toward conflict in response to China’s assertiveness 
The second explanation submits that the trade ties between China, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines have become strong enough to make regional armed conflict cost 
prohibitive, undesirable, and therefore unlikely. The explanation contends that China’s 
economic growth and opening of trade with Vietnam and the Philippines have made the 
two smaller states economically dependent on China. Thus, with armed conflict being 
cost prohibitive to Vietnam and the Philippines, they may be more likely to resort to 
cooperation than conflict to manage their overlapping territory and resource claims with 
China. 
The two explanations predict vastly diverging trajectories for the South China Sea 
security environment. Reviewing the conflict trends in South China Sea disputes and the 
economic environment between the states and China over the past three decades can help 
determine whether the South China Sea has trended toward increasing conflict or 
cooperation. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis evaluates the history of disputes over competing territory and resource 
claims and the economic relationships between China and its two neighbors, Vietnam and 
the Philippines, to assess the trend toward conflict or cooperation in the region. The thesis 
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reviews the history of engagements, standoffs, clashes, and armed conflict between 
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines over territory and resource competitions during the 
last three decades to evaluate how the states have managed the disputes and determine 
whether they are trending toward conflict. The thesis also evaluates the economic 
environment between China and its two neighbors to determine their economic 
interdependence and whether or not increased economic ties have trended the states 
toward increasing cooperation to settle disputes. Based on these assessments, the thesis 
aims to demonstrate that China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have managed their 
disputes short of armed conflict, despite increasing tensions and that economic 
interdependence has played at a role in the relative peace in the region. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis includes four main chapters. This first introductory chapter presents 
the research question, its relevance, a literature review, and potential hypotheses. The 
literature review includes basic summaries of realist and economic interdependence 
theories being examined and how they have been applied to the South China Sea 
environment. The literature review also includes preliminary evidence that supports each 
theory. 
The second chapter reviews engagements, standoffs, clashes, and the only armed 
conflict in the South China Sea over territory and resource disputes. The chapter 
demonstrates that the states have managed tensions and avoided armed conflict for nearly 
three decades. It also illustrates that the states have actively sought ways to deescalate 
standoffs short of armed conflict, despite increasing competition and tensions.  
The third chapter describes the growing economic ties that Vietnam and the 
Philippines’ have established with China. The chapter illustrates that the smaller 
countries’ pursuit of economic strength to counter internal and external threats led them 
to establish economic ties and subsequent economic interdependence with China. 
Although the interdependence has been asymmetric, it correlates to a lack of armed 
conflict over South China Sea disputes and, at times, periods of cooperation to manage 
their disputes. 
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The final chapter presents conclusions based on the evidence presented in 
Chapters II and III. The conclusion demonstrates that the states have not trended toward 
armed conflict over their South China Sea disputes, despite growing tensions. 
Furthermore, although Vietnam and the Philippines have grown increasingly 
economically dependent on China, cooperation between the states to manage disputes has 
been limited. Moreover, Beijing has attempted to use its asymmetric economic advantage 
over its smaller neighbors to change the status quo in the South China Sea. As Vietnam 
and the Philippines recognized the vulnerabilities they incurred with their dependence on 
China’s economy, the worked to diversify their economic ties. The conclusion also makes 
recommendations for future study and policy recommendations that may assist in 
assessing regional stability. 
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II. TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS OF AVOIDING ARMED 
CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: ASSESSING “ASIA’S 
CAULDRON” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Robert Kaplan has stated, “Anyone who speculates that, with globalization, 
territorial boundaries and fights for territory have lost their meaning should behold the 
South China Sea.”75 He proposes that the growing tensions between South China Sea 
states, as they challenge one another for territory and resources, has developed into 
“Asia’s cauldron” and will erupt into “the military front lines” of a future war.76 
Reviewing the competition for territory and resources between the states over the last 30 
years, however, does not indicate an increasing trend for armed conflict. Although the 
competition has intensified and the states have strengthened their military and maritime 
capabilities, just a single armed conflict has occurred involving the current governments 
of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, taking place in the Spratly Islands more than 28 
years ago, during March of 1988, between China and Vietnam.77  
The citizens and states surrounding the South China Sea have competed with one 
another for resources and territories, leading to an increase in engagements, which at 
times have escalated to standoffs, clashes, and even armed conflict. Civilizations 
surrounding the South China Sea have long valued its resources, primarily fish and, more 
recently, speculated hydrocarbon reserves. Following the decolonization of East and 
Southeast Asia following World War II, the region’s civilizations formed independent 
sovereign states. As the populations of these states grew, so did their resource 
requirements. Growing resource requirements resulted in overlapping maritime and 
territorial claims to secure resources near features, such as islands, islets, shoals, reefs, 
and rocks, within the South China Sea. Subsequently, the populations of these states have 
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York: Random House, 2014), Kindle 286. 
76 Ibid., Kindle 287–288. 
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increasingly engaged and competed with one another while harvesting resources, 
exploring for hydrocarbons, or attempting to secure their claims to the body of water. 
Many engagements have resulted in standoffs between the states, with no clear winner. 
Some of the standoffs have escalated into clashes involving military and law enforcement 
assets in efforts to settle the disputes. Yet, only one of the clashes has escalated to armed 
conflict.  
Enabled by economic growth, China has increased and modernized its maritime 
capabilities and military strength to control the competition for territories and resources. 
Consequently, Vietnam and the Philippines have sought to increase their capabilities to 
counter China’s assertion of control. The engagements between these states over territory 
and resource competition, and the ensuing military buildup, have led observers to believe 
that there is significant potential for armed conflict in the South China Sea.78  
What has been the trend for standoffs and clashes over territory and resource 
competition in the South China Sea escalating toward armed conflict between China and 
its two neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines? This chapter argues that there has not 
been an increasing trend for standoffs and clashes over territories and resources in the 
South China Sea escalating into armed conflict. The only armed conflict between the 
current governments of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines occurred nearly three 
decades ago. Since then, the states have more actively sought to avoid armed conflict. 
China, as the more powerful and capable nation, has limited its use of military assets to 
respond to standoffs and clashes. Although the smaller states have attempted to balance 
against the perceived Chinese threat during the last few decades by pursuing self-
strengthening efforts, their efforts have been hindered by a lack of resources and, in the 
case of the Philippines, internal threats. In effect, Manila has sought external balancing 
measures with the United States. Vietnam, however, has avoided bipolar balancing with 
external powers to avoid provoking its powerful neighbor. This chapter reviews the 
history of South China Sea engagements, standoffs, clashes, and armed conflict between 
these states over territory and resources, assesses the frequency and intensity of the 
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states’ responses to these events, and reviews Vietnam and the Philippines’ limited 
strengthening and balancing efforts to illustrate the states’ trend of avoiding armed 
conflict. 
B. ESCALATION OF ENGAGEMENTS OVER TERRITORIES AND 
RESOURCES 
Reviewing the escalation of South China Sea engagements between China, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines reveals that, although engagements have become more 
frequent, they rarely escalate to clashes involving military forces or armed conflict. 
Additionally, the history of engagements over the last 28 years shows that China, despite 
its increasing and relatively overwhelming military and maritime capabilities when 
compared to its neighbors, has resorted to less militarized means in response to 
engagements over the years. Moreover, the smaller countries have also started using 
fewer military assets and have pursued diplomatic measures to respond to China’s 
actions, thus limiting the potential for armed conflict. This section is broken up into two 
subsections. The first establishes the levels used to define escalation of engagements used 
in this thesis: engagements, standoffs, clashes, and armed conflict. The following 
subsection reviews the escalation of engagements between the states by breaking them 
down into two categories: competition over territory and competition over resources. 
1. Engagements, Standoffs, Clashes, and Armed Conflict 
To explain that there is not an increasing trend for armed conflict in the South 
China Sea, it helps to first establish and define the categories of interactions between 
China and its neighbors used in this thesis: engagements, standoffs, clashes, and armed 
conflicts. For the purposes of this thesis, an engagement is considered any time citizens 
of one country came into contact with those from another.79 As examples, Chinese and 
Filipino fishermen meeting at the same fishing grounds or Vietnamese maritime patrols 
discovering a Chinese oilrig in an area of overlapping claims are considered 
engagements. A standoff is considered any time an engagement led to an argument or 
                                                 
79 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 4th ed., s.v. “engage.” 
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contest with no clear winner.80 A few standoffs have persisted over time and escalated 
and deescalated without being ultimately resolved. For instance, the competition for 
hydrocarbon exploration between China and Vietnam is considered a persistent standoff, 
as harassments from both sides have resulted in escalations at times, but neither side has 
made clear progress in finding and extracting hydrocarbons. A clash is considered any 
engagement that involved state or military assets or personnel from either side and 
included arrests, fired shots, colliding vessels, intentional damage to equipment, or death 
of fewer than 25 personnel.81 For example, occurrences of China Marine Surveillance 
(CMS) vessels deliberately cutting the cables of Vietnamese seismic survey ships are 
considered clashes. If the engagement involved military forces from both sides and 
resulted in 25 or more battle-related deaths, it is considered an armed conflict.82 
2. Competition for Territory and Resources 
The competition in the South China Sea combined with China’s sovereignty claim 
to nearly the entire body of water with its “nine-dashed line” has made engagements with 
its neighbors more frequent and contentious.83 The competition between China, Vietnam, 
and the Philippines can be divided into two general categories: competition for 
territory—including islands, islets, shoals, reefs, and rocks—and competition for 
resources, notably fish and speculated hydrocarbon reserves. During the last three 
decades, the increasing frequency of engagements over territory and resources coincided 
with China’s attempts to formally establish legal control over the South China Sea, as 
seen in 1992, 1999, and 2007. In 1992, China adopted a law to unilaterally establish legal 
claim over South China Sea features and island groupings, including the Spratlys and 
Paracels.84 In 1999, China unilaterally began imposing an annual fishing ban over 
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portions of the South China Sea.85 In 2007, Beijing passed legislation to govern the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands from its Hainan province.86 Moreover, Beijing has increased 
its maritime law enforcement capabilities to back up its legal efforts, further increasing 
the frequency and intensity of engagements and standoffs between the states. 
The following sections review the history of engagements, standoffs, clashes, and 
armed conflict between the current governments of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
over South China Sea territories and resources to demonstrate that, despite growing 
tensions, armed conflicts have not occurred since 1988. For territorial disputes, the 
section focuses primarily on two contentious island groupings: the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands. The review of resource disputes focuses on engagements over hydrocarbon 
exploration and fishing. The review begins with an armed conflict over territory between 
China and Vietnam in 1988 and continues with standoffs through 2015. 
a. Armed Conflict in the Spratly Islands in 1988 
Engagements in the South China Sea have escalated to armed conflict involving 
the current state governments just once. The engagement over territory in the Spratlys 
remains as a standoff today. Although another armed conflict occurred between the 
Chinese and South Vietnamese governments over territory in the Paracel Islands in 1974, 
South Vietnam’s government no longer exists and, therefore, is not included in this 
review.87 
On 14 March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese forces escalated an engagement to 
armed conflict in the disputed Spratly Islands near Fiery Cross Reef, located 
approximately 300 miles east of Vietnam’s southeastern shores. The conflict escalated 
from an engagement on 22 January, when a the crew of a Vietnamese ship discovered a 
Chinese naval engineering team at Fiery Cross Reef, dredging coral to build up man-
made features and create dry land for the construction of outposts. By the time of the 
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discovery, the Chinese team was building structures on the previously uninhabitable 
rocks, reefs, and shoals near Vietnam’s outposts in the vicinity of Johnson Reef. In 
response, Vietnam deployed three ships with troops to stake claims on three additional 
features within the Spratlys—Lansdowne, Collins, and Johnson Reefs. At Johnson Reef, 
the Vietnamese forces clashed with Chinese forces, and the engagement escalated into 
armed conflict.88 When the battle ended, the Chinese had killed an estimated 70 
Vietnamese troops and destroyed all three of their ships.89 Although the Chinese won the 
battle for Johnson Reef in 1988, the control of the Spratlys between China and Vietnam 
remains at a standoff, with both countries occupying outposts and claiming sovereignty 
over the islands.90 The standoff, however, has not escalated to armed conflict since. 
b. Standoffs in the Spratly Islands: 1995–2015 
An engagement in early 1995 between China and the Philippines over sovereignty 
in the Spratly Islands developed into a standoff that persists today. At times, the standoff 
has escalated to clashes involving military forces, but thus far, it has not escalated into 
armed conflict. The standoff escalated from an engagement that began when the crew of 
the Philippine fishing vessel Analita discovered newly built Chinese structures on 
Mischief Reef, located within the Spratlys and roughly 140 miles northwest of the 
Philippine island of Palawan.91 The Chinese structures included a 300-meter-long pier, 
barracks, and an apparent command and control center constructed on Philippine claimed 
maritime features.92 After the Philippine discovery, the Chinese occupants detained the 
Analita’s crew on site for a week, thus escalating the situation to a clash. After their 
release and return to the Philippines, the crew reported the Chinese activities to the 
Philippine government.  
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Surprised by the Chinese presence and with limited military options, Manila 
responded through diplomatic pressure but received mixed results. President Fidel 
Ramos’ administration attempted to internationalize the incident by ferrying local and 
foreign journalists to report on China’s activities at the reef. The administration also 
appealed to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pressure Beijing, 
resulting in senior ASEAN officials collectively confronting China on the matter during 
the first ASEAN-China dialogue in April 1995. Manila’s diplomacy proved somewhat 
successful, as ASEAN’s support demonstrated that the organization was willing to 
confront China on its unilateral and destabilizing activities in the South China Sea.93 
Beijing also agreed to bilateral talks with Manila, and on 10 August, after the incident 
had deescalated, China and the Philippines issued a joint statement, declaring that their 
South China Sea disputes would be resolved peacefully through consultations, 
cooperation, and mutual respect.94 Manila’s efforts had limited effects, however, as the 
Chinese occupied structures remain on Mischief Reef today.95 
In 1999, the standoff in the Spratlys between China and the Philippines escalated 
to a clash again, this time at Second Thomas Shoal, located about 130 miles northwest of 
Palawan. Tensions escalated when the crew of the Philippine naval ship BRP Sierra 
Madre deliberately ran the ship aground at the shoal to assert Philippine sovereignty in 
the Spratlys.96 Through rotation of personnel and resupply efforts, the Philippine 
government has maintained a crew of marines aboard the grounded ship to guard its 
sovereignty to this day.97  
                                                 
93 Noel M. Morada and Christopher Collier, “The Philippines: State Versus Society,” in Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto, CA; Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 573–74.  
94 “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China, 7 December 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml; Zou Keyuan, “Scarborough Reef: A 
New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, summer (1999), 77. 
95 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 84–89. 
96 Ibid., 103–4. 
97 “Interactive Map,” Maritime Awareness Project, The National Bureau of Asian Research and the 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, accessed 22 April 2016, 
http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/interactive-map/.  
 22
Tensions over the standoff at Second Thomas Shoal have fluctuated in intensity 
since 2013, when China began active opposition to the Philippine presence there. In May 
2013, China deployed two maritime surveillance ships and a naval frigate to within five 
nautical miles of the feature, which the Philippines viewed as an attempt to block 
resupply efforts for the Sierra Madre’s crew. Tensions increased again in March 2014, 
when two Chinese Coast Guard ships successfully blocked Philippine resupply efforts. 
China defended the actions by contending that the supplies contained materials meant to 
establish more permanent structures at the shoal.98 Chinese attempts to block Sierra 
Madre resupply efforts continued through 2015, often with two Chinese Coast Guard 
ships hovering near the shoal.99  
Although the standoff at Second Thomas Shoal continues, it has not escalated to 
armed conflict, and the Philippines, limited in its maritime capabilities, has resorted to 
peaceful and diplomatic measures to resolve the standoff without surrendering its claims. 
For example, Manila began using unarmed naval vessels for resupply and announcing 
personnel rotation dates to Beijing in advance. The government has also adopted less 
risky means of challenging China’s claims, such as filing a case under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) through the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ).100 China’s use of coast guard and maritime surveillance vessels, rather than 
combatants, is a sign that Beijing is attempting keep the standoff from escalating as well. 
c. Standoffs over Resources: 1994 through 2015 
Like territorial disputes, early disputes over South China Sea resources between 
China and its two neighbors escalated quickly, but more recent disputes have been less 
militarized, with each side taking measures to limit escalation. Some of the most 
contentious engagements over resources between China and Vietnam primarily began 
with oil exploration during 1994 in the contested oil exploration area, WAB-21, and 
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continue today. Some of the most contentious engagements over resources between 
China and the Philippines primarily began with fishing at Scarborough Shoal in 1998, 
which has since developed into a territorial standoff that also continues today. In 1999, a 
Chinese unilaterally imposed fishing ban in the Spratly and Paracel Islands led to 
increased tensions with both Vietnam and the Philippines. Although many of the disputes 
over South China Sea resources have escalated to clashes over the years and still remain 
as standoffs, none have escalated into armed conflict as seen in 1988. 
d. Standoffs over Oil Exploration: 1994–2015 
Engagements over oil exploration between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
have evolved into enduring standoffs. The standoff between China and Vietnam escalated 
into clashes in 1994, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. The standoff between China and the 
Philippines involved a military response in 2011 but has never escalated to a clash. 
Furthermore, the governments have limited their use of military assets in their more 
recent responses and have pursued other de-escalation measures to avoid arm conflict.  
The standoff over oil between China and Vietnam began with an engagement 
during April of 1994 in WAB-21, located roughly 150 miles southeast of Vietnam. The 
engagement occurred after the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
contracted an American oil company, Crestone, to conduct oil exploration in WAB-21. 
Four days after Crestone announced its exploration endeavors and deployed a 
seismographic survey rig to the contested area, Vietnam responded by deploying three 
naval vessels to the site. According to Randall Thompson, the American head of Crestone 
overseeing the operation, the Vietnamese vessels arrived at the scene and fired shots 
across the Chinese ship’s bow, turning the standoff into a clash. The incident de-escalated 
after two days, when the Chinese ship’s captain returned home. On 17 May, the 
Vietnamese deployed a contracted Russian oil-drilling rig to Vanguard Bank, lying 
within WAB-21. The standoff resumed when China responded by deploying two ships to 
block the delivery of food and supplies to the rig. The Vietnamese drilling teams endured 
the siege and continued operations for several weeks but eventually departed having 
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never found oil.101 Although the engagement at WAB-21 escalated into a clash involving 
military vessels reportedly firing shots, no lives or vessels were lost, in contrast to the 
states previous clash in the Spratlys, just six years prior.  
The oil exploration standoff between China and Vietnam escalated again on 
7 March 1997 in the Tonkin Gulf, but de-escalated peacefully and was followed up with 
improved diplomatic relations and bilateral agreements for joint exploration. The 
escalation occurred when China deployed two ships along with its Kantan-III mobile oil 
platform to explore for hydrocarbons in an area Vietnam considers within its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). When Vietnamese protests proved ineffective at halting China’s 
actions, Hanoi’s leaders turned to ASEAN and Washington for assistance. Within two 
weeks of the escalation, the U.S. Pacific Command Commander, Admiral Joseph 
Prueher, visited Vietnam, becoming the highest-ranking U.S. military leader to visit the 
country since the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations. Subsequently, China 
removed its vessels from the area on 1 April and agreed to settle the dispute through 
diplomatic discussions.102 By December of 2000, with the framework for discussions 
already in place, China and Vietnam’s leaders signed the “Agreement on the 
Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves in the Gulf 
of Tonkin.”103 In 2006, China and Vietnam signed an additional agreement for joint oil 
exploration in an area within the Tonkin Gulf. The two countries’ leaders agreed to 
expand the area in June 2016.104 
A March 2011 engagement between China and the Philippines over oil 
exploration near Reed Bank escalated to involve a military response from the Philippines 
but de-escalated short of a clash or armed conflict.105 During the two months prior to the 
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engagement, the French-owned seismic survey ship MV Veritas Voyager, contracted by 
the Philippines, had conducted oil exploration near Reed Bank, located roughly 100 miles 
from Palawan. The engagement began on 1 March, with the arrival of Chinese CMS 
vessels at Reed Bank in response to the Filipino surveys. After the crew of the CMS 
vessels ordered the Voyager to leave, the Chief of the Western Command of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) responded by launching two unarmed OV-10 spotter 
aircraft and deploying two naval vessels, the BRP Rajah Humabon and BRP Rizal, to the 
site.106 The CMS vessels departed before the Philippine ships arrived at the scene, 
however, and the survey continued to completion. Surprised by the Chinese ships’ 
assertive presence within 100 miles Palawan Island and east of the Spratlys, the 
Philippine government filed a protest at Beijing’s Manila embassy.107 Although the 
engagement at Reed Bank involved a military response from the Philippines, China’s 
response was non-military, there were no reported fired shots, and Manila concluded the 
engagement with a diplomatic protest. 
In May 2011, another engagement between China and Vietnam continued their 
standoff over oil exploration, this time soliciting a more aggressive but still non-military 
response from Beijing.108 Prior to the engagement, the Vietnamese-contracted survey 
ship Binh Minh 02 had conducted oil exploration operations within 100 miles of 
Vietnam’s coastal city of Nha Trang.109 The standoff escalated on 26 May when three 
CMS vessels arrived at the oil survey area. Expecting the CMS ships would disrupt the 
operation, two Vietnamese fishing trawlers positioned themselves around the Binh Minh 
to protect the ship’s survey cable but were unsuccessful. One of the CMS ships severed 
the cable while crossing the Binh Minh’s stern. The Vietnamese were able to retrieve and 
repair the cable and returned to the survey site a week later, this time with eight 
escorts.110 
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The standoff escalated again two weeks later with another clash near WAB-21 
over a joint seismic survey endeavor between Canadian and Vietnamese companies, 
using another French-owned ship, the Veritas Viking 2. The standoff escalated on 8 and 9 
June when two Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) vessels and a 
flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels appeared on the scene. Despite warnings from an 
accompanying Vietnamese Coast Guard ship to stay clear of the operation, one of the 
Chinese trawlers managed to entangle its net with the Viking 2’s survey cable, at which 
time a FLEC vessel intervened, cut the cable and nets, and freed the trawler. Bill Hayton 
labels the Chinese actions as “an elaborate charade to justify the cutting of the cable.”111 
China’s cable-cutting tactics continued through 2013, with Binh Minh 02 falling victim 
again on 30 November 2012, near the Paracel Islands. According to Hayton, regional 
criticism of “bullying” caused Beijing to realize “that CMS and FLEC went too far.”112 
In March 2013, Beijing announced plans to consolidate its numerous maritime 
organizations under one administration. From then through 2015, there appear to be no 
additional reports of Chinese cable cutting.113  
The oil exploration standoff between China and Vietnam escalated again on 
 2 May 2014, when the CNOOC Haiyang Shiyou-981 (HD-981) oilrig deployed to an 
area west of the Paracel Islands and within 130 miles of Vietnam’s coast.114 China 
announced that the HD-981 drilling operations would continue through August and 
declared a 3-mile security standoff distance from the operation—greater than the 
UNCLOS stipulated 500-meter safety zone. Additionally, China deployed over 100 
vessels, including civilian fishing boats, coast guard vessels, and People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) ships to form a multi-layered security perimeter around HD-981.115 
Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh responded on 6 May with diplomatic 
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protests to Beijing, demanding the withdrawal of HD-981.116 At the drilling site, the 
standoff turned into a clash as Chinese vessels used water cannons and reportedly 
rammed Vietnamese vessels, causing one to sink, while enforcing their security 
perimeter.117 Both the Chinese and Vietnamese, however, primarily relied on civil 
maritime, rather than military, vessels during the clash. Additionally, the two 
governments maintained diplomatic engagements in an effort to resolve the standoff 
peacefully.118 Concurrently in Vietnam, however, violent anti-Chinese protests erupted, 
targeting Chinese-owned industries and businesses and resulting in at least two Chinese 
casualties, 100 more injured, and the evacuation of 3,000 Chinese citizens.119  
The standoff deescalated on 15 July, when Beijing announced the completion of 
HD-981’s drilling operations and withdrew the rig from the contested area, 
approximately one month earlier than originally planned.120 The exact reason for HD-
981’s early withdrawal is unclear. Some claim it was in response to typhoon season, 
while others claim it was due to Vietnam’s diplomatic pressure, and still others claim the 
drilling operation was simply complete.121 Regardless, both sides limited their use of 
military force, and the standoff de-escalated short of armed conflict. Moreover, the 
clashes that resulted in casualties occurred among the civilian population within Vietnam 
and were not state-sanctioned uses of force.  
The standoffs between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines over oil exploration 
have not been resolved. China deployed the HD-981 to areas south of Hainan Island 
again in June 2015 and as recently as January 2016. Although Hanoi has made diplomatic 
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protests that the rig has entered disputed waters, it appears Beijing has kept its operations 
far enough away from Vietnam to avoid the escalation of violent protests seen in 2014.122 
For Vietnam and the Philippines, the international energy companies that they often 
depend on have concluded that operations in the contested waters are too risky, thus 
leaving the smaller countries with few options short of diplomatic and public protests and 
attempts to interfere with China’s operations with their limited maritime assets.123 
Moreover, each government appears to be limiting its use of military assets in the 
standoffs, thus reducing the potential for escalation toward armed conflict over 
hydrocarbons. 
e. Standoff over Fishing Resources: 1997–2015 
The South China Sea competition for fishing resources has led to violent clashes 
between state-controlled organizations and fishermen from China, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines, but the states have de-escalated the clashes short of armed conflict. The 
standoff over fishing between China and the Philippines largely began in 1997 at 
Scarborough Shoal. China’s 1999 unilaterally announced South China Sea fishing ban—
which Beijing has since periodically enforced —increased tensions with both Vietnam 
and the Philippines. Subsequently, more engagements over fishing have escalated into 
clashes. Some of the clashes involved military forces and assets, ramming and sinking of 
vessels, confiscation of equipment, and arrests. At least one of the clashes between China 
and Vietnam in 1999 resulted in deaths. None of the standoffs over fishing, however, has 
escalated to armed conflict. Additionally, the states have taken measures to manage 
clashes and resolve their disputes over fishing peacefully.124  
In April of 1997, an engagement between China and the Philippines over fishing 
resources in and around Scarborough Shoal escalated into a standoff that persists 
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today.125 The standoff quickly evolved into a clash on 20 May 1997, and clashes 
occurred again in 1998, 1999, and 2015. Like the standoffs over oil, however, both sides 
have limited their use of military assets in their later responses. 
Scarborough Shoal, claimed by both China and the Philippines, is located roughly 
150 nautical miles west of the Philippine island of Luzon and is known by fishermen and 
mariners throughout the region for its abundant marine life and as a sanctuary for 
mariners evading foul weather. An engagement at the shoal on 30 April 1997 escalated 
when Philippine naval ships blocked three Chinese vessels from approaching the feature. 
Following the engagement, the Filipinos planted a Philippine flag at the shoal to assert 
their nation’s sovereignty there, which drew diplomatic protests from Beijing.126 The 
standoff escalated on 20 May, when the Philippine Navy apprehended 21 Chinese 
fishermen near Scarborough Shoal. The fishermen were charged with illegal entry and 
poaching in the Philippine EEZ, which drew more diplomatic protests from the Chinese 
embassy in Manila.127 The Philippine court eventually dropped the illegal entry charges, 
deescalating the standoff.128 The standoff escalated again in 1998, when the Philippine 
Navy detained 22 Chinese fishermen near the shoal in January and 29 more in March. 
Among other charges, the fishermen were arrested for illegally gathering endangered 
marine species. The arrests resulted in more diplomatic protests from the Chinese 
embassy and demands for release of the fishermen, as Beijing maintained they were 
operating in Chinese waters.129 
In 1999, the same year Beijing announced its South China Sea fishing ban, the 
standoff between China and the Philippines over fishing expanded and escalated beyond 
Scarborough Shoal, as the Philippine Navy patrolled and engaged with Chinese 
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fishermen in what Manila considered as its territorial waters and EEZ. In May, for 
example, a Philippine naval vessel, chasing a group of three Chinese trawlers from waters 
claimed by both countries, collided with and sank one of the Chinese boats. In July, 
another Philippine naval patrol, chasing two Chinese fishing boats in the Spratlys, 
collided with and sank another Chinese boat.130  
The standoff between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal escalated 
again in April 2012, when a Philippine surveillance aircraft detected eight Chinese 
fishing vessels near the shoal. Manila responded on 10 April by deploying the Philippine 
Navy flagship, BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, to confront the fishermen. In turn, China 
responded by deploying two CMS ships to the site to prevent the arrest.131 In response to 
international and domestic criticism for potentially escalating the standoff by sending a 
combatant to the scene, Manila eventually exchanged its flagship for smaller coast guard 
vessels.132 China, on the other hand, maintained the appearance of a more benign 
presence at the shoal by deploying only civilian law enforcement vessels, although these 
included its largest and most-advanced FLEC ships, which outmatched the Del Pilar.133 
The standoff deescalated on 18 June with an understanding that both sides would 
withdraw from the shoal. Only the Philippines fully complied, however, as the Chinese 
left seven law enforcement vessels at the feature.134 In August, the Chinese cordoned the 
opening to the shoal’s protective waters, and six months later three Chinese government 
vessels remained to control access. As of 2015, the Chinese continued to deploy coast 
guard ships to prevent other nations’ vessels from entering the shoal.135 The standoff 
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escalated again as recently as February of 2015, as the Philippines reported Chinese 
Coast Guard ships ramming three Filipino fishing boats in the vicinity of the fishing 
grounds.136 
Tensions between China and Vietnam over fishing began to escalate in 1999, as 
well, and although engagements have evolved to a standoff, which has escalated to 
clashes at times, since 2011, the two governments have increased means of managing 
emerging crises. Immediately following China’s 1999 fishing ban through 2008, China 
and Vietnam managed tensions over fishing, maintained relatively stable relations, and in 
December of 2000, even established an enduring cooperation agreement over fishing in 
the Tonkin Gulf.137 The states maintained stable relations despite a clash in January 
2005, when Chinese maritime police killed nine Vietnamese fishermen in the Tonkin 
Gulf.138 Anxious to maintain good relations with China, the VCP actively subdued public 
discontent and suppressed protests triggered by the incident.139 
In contrast to the relatively stable relations up to 2008, from 2009 through 2011 
numerous clashes were reported between Vietnamese fishermen and Chinese maritime 
law enforcement and naval personnel. For example, when China announced another 
fishing ban in May 2009, Vietnam  responded adversely and released information about 
Chinese maritime patrol forces detaining three Vietnamese fishing boats and 37 
fishermen while operating in the Paracels. China seized another Vietnamese boat in 
August.140 February through September of 2010 saw six separate incidents of China 
aggressively enforcing the fishing ban. The incidents included boarding and detaining 
Vietnamese fishing boats, seizing catches and equipment, and fining and sometimes 
arresting crews operating in and around the Paracel Islands. Vietnam’s media sources 
reported 433 Vietnamese fishermen arrested and 33 fishing vessels detained by China 
during 2009. Vietnam reported similar numbers in 2010. During China’s 2011 fishing 
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ban, Vietnam had fewer reported incidents. It is unclear, however, whether the reduction 
in reports was due to less aggressive Chinese action, more cases of Vietnamese fishermen 
remaining in port to avoid conflict, more suppression of media reports by the VCP in the 
interest of preserving China relations, or combinations of each.141 
Beginning in 2010, an increase in diplomatic events between China and Vietnam 
corresponded with and likely contributed to the de-escalation of tensions over fishing. In 
2010, the two states conducted five meetings to discuss their “fundamental guiding 
principles” for managing bilateral maritime disputes.142 In June 2011, the VCP sent Ho 
Xuan Son, its deputy minister for foreign affairs, on a special envoy to meet with his 
counterpart in Beijing as a response to increasing tensions and a deadlock over maritime 
matters that involved third-party states. During the talks, the deputy ministers agreed that 
the governments needed to guide public sentiment in order to avoid actions and 
statements that were harmful to peaceful relations between the countries. They also 
agreed to accelerate negotiations for the principles guiding the settlement of maritime 
disputes and implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DOC), adopted by ASEAN and China foreign ministers in 2002.143 In 
October 2011, the VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited Beijing, marking 
the first meeting between party leads since 2008. During October, the two governments 
also signed The Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-Related 
Issues, in which the governments agreed that settling their maritime disputes would 
enhance peace, stability, development, and cooperation in the region.144 The agreement 
also established the groundwork for implementing periodic discussions between 
government officials, conducting unscheduled meetings if required, and creating hotlines 
between lead officials to manage emergent crises. By March 2012, the countries’ deputy 
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foreign ministers opened their first hotline between foreign ministries and agreed to 
establish regular working groups to negotiate and cooperate over South China Sea 
matters. In June 2013, the governments’ agricultural ministries opened hotlines for 
emergent incidents involving fishing.145 
In summary, despite the episodes of escalation, the Philippine, Vietnamese, and 
Chinese governments seemed to have been seeking opportunities to avoid armed conflict 
over fishing standoffs. For example, since deescalating from the Philippine response in 
2012, both sides appear to have limited the use of military assets in response to the 
standoff in the Spratlys. In addition to Manila’s repeated diplomatic protests against 
China over Scarborough Shoal, in January 2013 the Philippines initiated proceedings 
under UNCLOS to settle its overlapping claims with China.146 Vietnam and China have 
developed means to de-escalate disputes and avoid armed conflict as well, including 
discussions, working groups, agreements, hotlines, and even joint oil exploration 
operations. Although tensions have fluctuated through periods of escalation and de-
escalation, the states have avoided armed conflict since 1988. 
C. EFFORTS TO BALANCE AGAINST CHINA 
As realists would predict, Vietnam and the Philippines have attempted to balance 
against China but with limited results. The standoffs and clashes between the smaller 
countries and China reveal stark differences in the formers’ maritime capabilities when 
compared to their powerful opposition. During the last two decades, both Hanoi and 
Manila engaged in various attempts at strengthening, but both countries lack the 
resources and financial growth to support defense budgets capable of competing with 
Beijing’s.147 While Vietnam remains cautious about provoking anger in its northern 
neighbor by establishing enduring security connections with prominent world powers, the 
Philippines has rekindled security ties with its long time external security provider, the 
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United States.148 This section reviews the defense budgets, equipment modernization 
attempts, and balancing efforts of the Hanoi and Manila governments during their 
challenge to strengthen and balance against China. 
1. Vietnam: Omni-Balancing and a Little Internal Strengthening 
Vietnam has responded to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea with a 
combination of omni-balancing and a little internal strengthening. Vietnam’s economic 
growth during most of the last three decades created an opportunity to bolster its 
territorial defense capabilities. Consequently, the VCP increased its defense budget, 
reaching $4.3 billion in 2014, more than doubling since 2005.149 By comparison, 
Vietnam’s 2014 defense budget equaled just 0.2 percent of China’s $202.4 billion 2014 
defense spending.150 Although Vietnam’s defense budget rose above 2 percent of its GDP 
beginning in 2007, from 2003 to 2014, it never rose above 2.3 percent GDP (see Figure 
1).151 If the VCP was aggressively strengthening against China, one might expect a more 
dramatic increase in its defense budget corresponding to the 2011 and 2012 escalating 
tensions in the countries’ standoff over oil exploration and fishing resources.  
Despite the overwhelming asymmetry between Vietnam and China’s defense 
budgets, Hanoi has pursued more robust weapons and platforms to strengthen against 
China. For example, Vietnam has purchased cheaper weapon systems optimized to inflict 
intense damage on naval fleets threatening its sovereignty close to home and far from 
their adversary’s homeports. Vietnam operates small fast attack boats and purchased two 
batteries of Russian long-range anti-ship missile systems and Israeli anti-ship ballistic 
missiles to deter more powerful, threatening naval forces.152 In December 2009, Vietnam 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung signed contracts with Russia for six Kilo-class 
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submarines and twelve Su-30MK2 fighter aircraft to modernize Vietnam’s force.153 At 
the same time, Dung’s Foreign Minister traveled to Washington to request that the United 
States lift its arms embargo that had been in place since the Vietnam War ended.154 
Regardless of Vietnam’s strengthening efforts, however, the VCP seems to understand 
the power asymmetry and that a hostile relationship with China could have costly 
results.155 
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As seen during the 1997 oil exploration incident in the Tonkin Gulf and the 2009 
foreign minister visit to Washington, Vietnam has sought balancing relationships with 
other countries in response to China’s actions. While the VCP has resisted alliances with 
external powers, it has cautiously balanced its security relationships between Beijing, 
Washington, and other states and multilateral organizations.157 Stronger security ties with 
the United States, however, have strained Sino-Vietnamese relations and, at times, 
resulted in Chinese punitive action against Vietnam.158 China’s punitive actions have 
instigated anti-Chinese nationalist protests against the VCP, which the party views as an 
internal threat to the regime.159 As such, some members of the VCP—regime 
conservatives, discussed more closely in Chapter III—have adopted a counter-dominance 
strategy that emphasizes multiple bilateral engagements to increase “strategic partners” 
and multilateral influence through ASEAN-led institutions.160 With its principle of 
consensus, however, it will be difficult to get ASEAN to unite against China given that 
only a few of its member nations have strong interests in the South China Sea. 
Regardless, Vietnam’s defense diversification is evident, as it maintained bilateral 
security relationships with 65 different countries in 2012. Furthermore, in Vietnam’s 
quest for defense diversification it has sought relationships with South Korea, India, 
Japan, and Australia.161 Consequently, the VCP has multilaterally diversified its security 
ties without provoking or creating a bipolar balance against China.  
2. The Philippines: Less Strengthening and More Balancing 
Like Hanoi, Manila has also shown some signs of strengthening and balancing 
against China. During the last three decades, however, internal threats and domestic 
politics interrupted strengthening efforts, and balancing efforts have focused primarily on 
rekindling strong bilateral security ties with Washington. Also like Vietnam, the 
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Philippines’ economic growth during most of the last three decades created an 
opportunity to bolster its defense capabilities. Despite its growth and China’s increased 
assertiveness, however, the Philippine defense investment as a percentage of its GDP has 
been on a slow decline since 2003 (see Figure 1). With a 2014 budget just less than 
$3.5 billion and at 1.9 percent of its GDP, Manila claims the lowest defense budget of the 
three states.162 
Moreover, the AFP’s strengthening efforts constantly fell victim to corrupt 
political processes and diversion of funds to perceived higher priorities. Despite adopting 
a military modernization plan in the mid-1990s, elite congressional politicians delayed 
and reduced promised defense dollars until the 1997 Asian financial crisis caused them to 
put the plan on hold indefinitely. At the start of the new millennium, Manila assumed that 
the Philippines would not confront external challenges to its territory until 2018 and 
directed the majority of its small defense budget to defeating internal threats, 
accordingly.163 Faced with multiple, rising insurgent movements from the Communist 
Party of the Philippines’ (CPP) New People’s Army (NPA), the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu 
Sayyaf terrorist group (ASG), in 2001, the President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo 
administration directed the AFP to concentrate efforts on internal security.164 As a result, 
the AFP diverted funds and materials earmarked for external defense capabilities toward 
combating internal threats.165 Thus, from 2002 to 2011, defense procurement reflected the 
Arroyo administration’s internal defense policy. The AFP purchased body armor, troop 
helmets, squad machine guns, and aircraft with night ground-attack capabilities.166 They 
also procured or reconditioned South Korean medium patrol craft, U.S. UH-1H Huey 
helicopters, and Thai OV-10 aircraft, all with limited external defense capabilities.167 
With no funds for external defense, Manila decommissioned the last of its aging F-5 
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fighter aircraft and deactivated its Air Defense Command in 2005, leaving the country 
essentially without air defense.168 
Shocked by China’s interference with Philippine oil exploration operations at 
Reed Bank during March 2011, the newly elected President Benigno Aquino III renewed 
efforts to modernize the Philippine forces but received minimal results.169 President 
Aquino pressured the navy to accelerate acquisition of secondhand U.S. Coast Guard 
cutters and directed the air force to find affordable fighter jets and upgrade the nation’s 
air defense.170 Military modernization plans, however, encountered its usual hurdles of 
small budgets and squandered funds.171 Debates over procuring new frigates and 
amphibious assault ships have yet to come to fruition, and the navy has been left 
operating aging World War II vessels.172 Plans from 2013 to purchase 12 Korean FA-50 
fighter aircraft for $420 million to rebuild its air defense will not produce all of the 
aircraft until 2017.173 
Like Manila’s strengthening efforts, its balancing efforts have fluctuated with 
perceived threats and changes in its presidential administrations but have produced 
stronger results. The U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), signed in 1951 and 
ratified in 1952, effectively allowed the Philippines to enjoy a reasonable level of U.S. 
protection against external threats until the U.S. withdrawal from Philippine bases in 
1992. With the end of the Cold War shifting Philippine priorities, a close vote by the 
Philippine Senate in 1991 ended U.S. forces’ enduring presence at Clark Air Base and 
Subic Naval Base.174 The U.S. base closure left the Philippines essentially defenseless 
against external threats and, worse yet, without the annual subsidy Washington had 
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provided to the AFP.175 In 1991, however, the perception of external threats to the 
Philippines, including from China, was minimal. The Philippines discovery of Chinese 
construction at Mischief Reef in 1995 shifted Manila’s perspective on defense. Lacking 
viable external defense capabilities, Manila began negotiating with Washington in 1996 
to implement a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which reopened the door for U.S. 
exercises and ship visits.176 By 2010, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea 
increased discussions among Philippine policymakers to further rekindle defense ties 
with Washington.177 The Philippines welcomed the 2010 announcement of the U.S. 
rebalance to the Pacific. By 2014, Manila’s concerns about an increasingly assertive 
China accelerated the drafting of the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (EDCA) that reaffirmed bilateral defense cooperation with Washington.178 
The Philippine balancing efforts have renewed security ties with the United States, which 
seem to grow stronger with China’s growing assertiveness. America has strong economic 
ties with China, however, which encourages Washington to mediate on behalf of both 
sides of disputes. 
D. CONFLICT CONCLUSION 
Although the frequency of engagements, standoffs, and clashes over territories 
and resources between China and its two neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines, 
increased between 1988 and 2015, they avoided any further armed conflict for nearly 
three decades. Moreover, during the last five years, each country appears to be taking 
measures to de-escalate clashes short of armed conflict. The first engagements between 
China and Vietnam in 1988 escalated quickly into an armed conflict between military 
forces that resulted in casualties and destroyed Vietnamese ships. Since then, the 
standoffs have involved fewer military assets and have resulted in fewer shots fired and 
less loss of life. Some of the standoffs, such as the one between China and the Philippines 
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over Scarborough Shoal, have escalated at times, involved military vessels as recently as 
2012, and resulted in government ships ramming fishing boats as recently as 2015. The 
casualties resulting from clashes have remained below the threshold of armed conflict. 
Moreover, the deaths and damage to equipment during the more recent standoffs over oil 
exploration near Vietnam in 2014 and over fishing at Scarborough Shoal in 2015 were 
due to civil uprisings or resulted from the actions of non-military vessels. Furthermore, 
the governments have avoided armed conflict by withdrawing their assets from escalating 
engagements and have sought other means of resolving their disputes. As the more 
powerful state with superior relative maritime capabilities, China appears to have learned 
from its earlier engagements and has been able to control the tempo and limit the 
escalation of the standoffs. For example, instead of using military vessels to respond to 
incidents, China depends on the more benign appearance of its FLEC, CMS, and coast 
guard vessels, albeit many of which rival the capabilities of Vietnam and the Philippines’ 
best combatants. The smaller states appear to have learned from the engagements as well 
and have limited their use of military assets to avoid provoking their powerful neighbor. 
Since their non-military maritime capabilities pale in comparison to China’s, the smaller 
states have limited their options to underwhelming physical presence and stronger 
diplomatic pressure to counter China’s action, or they effectively surrender their claims.  
Vietnam and the Philippines have engaged in limited strengthening and balancing 
efforts, as well, but with limited results. Their efforts to strengthen do not demonstrate a 
desire to compete with China militarily over their disputes. Vietnam remains cautious 
about provoking China through internal strengthening or external balancing. The 
Philippines’ diversion of resources away from external defense has left it seeking 
renewed security ties with the United States. 
The lack of armed conflict in the South China Sea between China, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines raises an additional question. The competition for territory and resources 
was important enough for China and Vietnam to expend national blood and treasure in 
1988. As the engagements, standoffs, and clashes have become more prevalent, why have 
the governments of these nations actively avoided armed conflict in recent years? The 
next chapter addresses one possible explanation, which is that growing economic 
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interdependence between these states and China inhibited them from doing so. For 
example, increased economic interdependence may have increased the cost of armed 
conflict to a level that each country found unacceptable, thus moving them toward 
cooperation, rather than conflict, to manage their disputes. 
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III. VIETNAM AND THE PHILIPPINES’ ECONOMIC 
(INTER)DEPENDENCE WITH CHINA: AVOIDING ARMED 
CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, Benjamin E. Goldsmith argued that “liberal expectations… about the 
importance of economic interdependence for reducing conflict in Asia are robustly 
confirmed.”179 Since he made this claim, tensions over territory and resource disputes in 
the South China Sea have increased, yet China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have 
continued to avoid armed conflict. Goldsmith’s claim suggests that it should be possible 
to see correlation and causation between Asia’s economic growth and the lack of armed 
conflict over South China Sea territory and resources since 1988, despite growing 
tensions. Hanoi and Manila’s pursuit of economic ties with Beijing not only correlates to 
relative peace in the region, it has even, at times, encouraged cooperation and agreements 
to manage their South China Sea disputes. 
Asia was not the first region in the world where a lower probability of conflict 
was attributed to increased economic interdependence. Prior to World War I, Norman 
Angell predicted that globalization and “the complex financial interdependence” between 
England and Germany would make armed conflict costly for both sides, eliminating the 
prospective gains for the victor, therefore making war less likely.180 Despite Angell’s 
assessment, however, the European governments proved that economic interdependence 
would not keep them from engaging in armed conflict. Subsequently, two global wars 
began in Europe with costly effects worldwide. In the aftermath of World War II and 
given the current interconnectedness of global economies, many would agree with 
Angell’s analysis that engaging in armed conflict for the conquest of another state’s 
territory and resources would disrupt global markets, with detrimental effects on all sides. 
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The last time China engaged in armed conflict over territory or resources in the 
South China Sea was with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands in 1988. Since then, Vietnam 
and the Philippines have engaged in standoffs with China, involving periods of 
fluctuating escalation of tensions, but the states have avoided armed conflict. The 
nations’ economies have also liberalized and grown during the last three decades. The 
smaller nations’ governments have sought economic ties with China, and vice versa, thus 
increasing the interconnectedness of their economies. The simple correlation between the 
nations’ growing economic ties and nearly three decades of relative peace, despite 
growing tensions, might suggest that economic interdependence, as predicted by Angell, 
is having the effect in the South China Sea that it failed to produce in Europe. 
How has economic interdependence between China and its neighbors, Vietnam 
and the Philippines, helped to deter armed conflict between the states over territory and 
resource disputes in the South China Sea since 1988? This chapter argues that 
asymmetric economic interdependence between the states has favored China and 
correlates to periods of cooperation, management of maritime disputes, and the lack of 
armed conflict in the South China Sea since 1988 but left the smaller states with limited 
options due to their vulnerability to China’s economic leverage. This chapter illustrates 
three major points regarding economic interdependence between China and its two 
neighbors. First, Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine economic ties prior to the 1988 
conflict were minimal compared to the rapidly growing, asymmetric, economic 
interdependence during the mid- to late 1990s and through 2015, which correlates to a 
lack of armed conflict in the South China Sea. Second, Vietnam and the Philippines 
pursued economic growth in response to threats, which eventually led to increasing 
asymmetric Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine economic ties. Finally, these growing 
economic ties correlate with a long period during which the three countries avoided 
armed conflict, while the smaller states accepted vulnerabilities caused by their economic 
dependence on China. 
 45
B. BILATERAL TRADE: FROM RELATIVELY MINIMAL TO 
NOTICEABLE ASYMMETRIC GROWTH 
Evidence of asymmetric economic interdependence correlating to the lack of 
armed conflict in the South China Sea can be found by looking at bilateral trade data 
between the smaller countries and China during the decade prior to the 1988 armed 
conflict at Johnson Reef and through 2015. Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine trade 
throughout the 1980s was relatively minimal when compared to trade relations during the 
1990s and through 2015. Figures 2 and 3 show Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine 
trade data from 1978 through 2015. The graphs depict each country’s imports and exports 
in relation to its counterpart as a percentage of the country’s total global imports and 
exports, respectively. For example, Figure 2 shows that during the three years following 
the Sino-Vietnamese armed conflict at Johnson Reef, Vietnam’s imports from China 
from 1989 to 1992 increased from zero to about 4 percent of Vietnam’s total imports. As 
another example, Figure 3 depicts that the Philippines sent about 46 percent of its global 
exports to China in 2007.181 The trade data shows increasing, yet asymmetric, economic 
interconnectedness between China and its two neighbors. 
Figure 2.  Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine Import Trade Data 
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Figure 3.  Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine Export Trade Data 
 
 
1. Sino-Vietnamese Trade Data 
Sino-Vietnamese trade ties increased from nearly nonexistent for the decade prior 
to the 1988 conflict to noticeable asymmetric interdependence after normalization of 
relations in 1990 and 1991.182 Low Sino-Vietnamese trade during the late 1970s and 
much of the 1980s correlates to poor relations between the states during that period, as 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and its border wars with China severely damaged Sino-
Vietnamese relations. Beijing consequently adopted its “bleed Vietnam” policy, aimed at 
diplomatically isolating its southern neighbor.183 Accordingly, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) reports no Sino-Vietnamese trade data from 1979 through 1988.  
By contrast, increasing Sino-Vietnamese trade relations throughout the 1990s 
were accompanied by a general improvement in bilateral relations and a lack of armed 
conflict in the South China Sea. During 1989, Chinese goods made up less than 1 percent 
of Vietnam’s imports, and less than 1 percent of Vietnam’s exports went to China. 
During 1992, the year following normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations, Chinese 
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products made up about 4 percent of Vietnam’s imports and, in general, the number 
continued to grow, reaching a high of 44 percent in 2014. Furthermore, Vietnam sent 
about 2 percent of its exports to China in 1992, and in general, that number continued to 
grow, reaching a high of roughly 15 percent as recently as 2015. Despite the growing 
South China Sea tensions covered in Chapter II, the Sino-Vietnamese trade numbers have 
tended to increase, while the states have avoided armed conflict.184  
The Sino-Vietnamese trade picture, however, has been asymmetric. For example, 
during 2015, China only sent 3 percent of its exports to Vietnam, compared to the 
15 percent Vietnam sent to China.185 Additionally, the Vietnamese trade deficit to China 
continued to grow with the increasing economic ties.186 This asymmetric trade 
relationship is more indicative of Vietnam’s economic dependence on China, rather than 
balanced interdependence between the two—an outcome that is not surprising given the 
disparity in size between the countries’ economies.  
2. Sino-Philippine Trade Data 
Sino-Philippine trade data indicates some differences and similarities to Sino-
Vietnamese trade data. In general, the data shows an asymmetric increase in bilateral 
trade relations and that trade increased despite growing South China Sea tensions. Unlike 
Sino-Vietnamese trade, the Philippines and China maintained bilateral trade throughout 
the 1980s. Despite continued trade throughout the 1980s, however, Sino-Philippine trade 
data does not indicate noticeable increases in the countries’ interconnectedness until later 
than the Sino-Vietnamese increases. Like China’s trade with Vietnam, Sino-Philippine 
economic interconnectedness shows similar rapid growth since 2000 but even more so 
with regard to the smaller country’s exports to China. For example, Philippine annual 
imports from China comprised of less than 7 percent of Philippine total imports until 
2002—the year following President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s assumption of office. 
The number continued to rise, reaching 36 percent in 2015. Likewise, Philippine exports 
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to China made up just 9 percent of the country’s total exports in 2002 but reached as high 
as 46 percent in 2007 and were still at 32 percent in 2015.187 Despite fluctuating tensions 
over SCS territory and resources, the countries have increased their economic 
interconnectedness, while the governments managed South China Sea disputes and 
avoided armed conflict. 
As with the Sino-Vietnam trade relationship, Sino-Philippine trade is very 
asymmetric. In 2015, while the Philippines exported about a third of its goods to China, 
the Chinese sent only about 1 percent of their exports to the Philippines. As with Sino-
Vietnamese trade relations, the asymmetry is more indicative of Philippine economic 
dependence on China than balanced interdependence between the two.  
3. Summary of Trade Data 
While differences exist in Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine trade relations, 
the trade data indicates that each of the smaller country’s economies have grown 
asymmetrically interconnected with China. The increasing interdependence correlates to 
a lack of armed conflict in the South China Sea reviewed in Chapter II, despite increasing 
tensions over territory and resource disputes. The relationships seem appropriately 
captured in Chong-pin Lin’s claim: “The economic dependence of its neighbors on China 
restrains them from launching war against it.”188 Vietnam and the Philippines 
intentionally pursued increased trade relations with China, despite the inherent 
vulnerabilities in this asymmetric outcome. 
C. THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH LED TO ASYMMETRIC 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
Vietnam and the Philippines’ pursuit of economic growth, largely beginning in 
mid-1980s, eventually led to increasing but asymmetric Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-
Philippine economic interdependence. This section reviews Vietnam and the Philippines’ 
pursuit of economic growth and highlights three additional commonalities in their paths. 
First, each country sought economic growth to increase national strength in response to 
                                                 
187 IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 
188 Lin, “Behind Rising East Asian Maritime Tensions,” 500. 
 49
threats. Second, eventually their paths led to economic ties with Beijing. Finally, once the 
countries established ties with China, the ties continued to grow despite increasing 
tensions over South China Sea disputes.  
1. Vietnam: How Threats to the Regime Led to Economic Ties with 
China 
Vietnam’s history of struggle against threats evolved into a path toward 
deepening economic ties and, at times, cooperation and agreements with China over oil 
exploration and fishing in the South China Sea. Before the Vietnamese Communist 
Party’s (VCP) active pursuit of economic growth in the mid-1980s, Vietnam’s past had 
been plagued with conflict and struggle for survival. As Vietnam’s powerful neighbor, 
China has played a key fixture in Vietnam’s struggle as well as its economic growth.189  
Decades of struggle and conflict led war-torn Vietnam into an economic crisis in 
the 1980s that shocked and threatened the VCP, shifted perspectives within its leadership, 
and inspired economic reform. After leading North Vietnam to victory over South 
Vietnam in 1975, the VCP engaged in military conflicts against Cambodia and China 
while facing trade embargos from the United States. Strained by conflicts, facing global 
isolation, and with a starving population at home, the VCP felt even more vulnerable with 
the collapse of communism in Europe during the 1980s, as the deterioration of the 
communist bloc challenged the basis of the regime’s socialist origins.  
Desperate to maintain regime and state survival during the early to mid-1980s, a 
modernization and reform movement within the VCP successfully pushed its doi moi, or 
renovation, strategy. Adopted by the VCP’s Sixth Party Congress in 1986, doi moi aimed 
to reform and modernize the party and Vietnam’s economy through increasing market 
liberalization and opening to the capitalist world.190 The collapse of the Soviet Union 
from 1989 through 1991 produced additional shock to the VCP, as it had relied on 
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Moscow for investment, trade, and aid. The fall of Vietnam’s primary economic, 
security, and political partner pushed the VCP to search for partners elsewhere.191 The 
economic successes of Vietnam’s East Asian neighbors with close ties to the West made 
them attractive trade options to reformers. Accordingly, and concurrent with the Soviet 
collapse, the VCP accelerated implementation of liberalizing economic reform policies 
and Vietnam’s integration into the rapidly growing East Asian economies.192  
Regime conservative elites, however, resisted rapid reform policies and pushed 
for closer ties with Beijing.193 Conservatives felt that doi moi caused too dramatic of a 
shift away from the VCP’s key socialist interests and feared the “peaceful evolution” of 
Western capitalist and democratic norms.194 Although, most party members agreed that 
modernization and openness to other countries as a friend and reliable partner were 
required for VCP survival, many regime conservatives favored “party first” and “closed 
door” policies. As such, conservatives pushed for closer ties with China than the United 
States.195 Washington’s resistance to the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s further inspired closer ties with China.196  
Concurrently, the VCP grew more inclined to recognize China’s position of 
strength in the region as Vietnam’s powerful neighbor with common socialist values. As 
such, the VCP realized the value of normalizing Sino-Vietnamese relations even at the 
cost of paying deference to Beijing.197 Despite VCP ambitions to normalize relations 
with China, Beijing was reluctant to develop close economic ties with Hanoi in 1991. 
Regardless of Beijing’s reluctance, by 1992, the VCP concluded that states could 
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cooperate and struggle and still maintain peaceful relations.198 Thus, the Party adopted a 
cooperate-and-struggle strategy, and its conservative agenda led it toward closer ties with 
Beijing. It was not until 1997, however, that Beijing opened up to closer economic 
cooperation with Vietnam.199  
Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had slowed Vietnam’s progress 
toward normalizing trade relations in 1991, by 1997 Chinese reformers had set out to 
reassure China’s Southeast Asian neighbors that its economic rise would be peaceful and 
beneficial to the region.200 As such, the CCP pursued closer Sino-Vietnamese economic 
ties, which coincide with increasing negotiations between the states to resolve South 
China Sea disputes. In December, CCP reformer Li Ruihuan visited Hanoi with a plan for 
reform that combined China’s national requirements with Marxist principles. The VCP 
General Secretary Le Kha Phieu accepted the relationship but also accepted a level of 
deference to China.201 Concurrent with Li Ruihuan’s visit to Hanoi, the VCP and CCP 
agreed to accelerate negotiations that led to the Tonkin Gulf border agreement of 2000, 
covered in Chapter II.202  
Li Ruihuan’s 1997 visit to Hanoi resulted in stronger Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic 
ties and trade relations. Although bilateral trade between China and Vietnam emerged 
after normalizing relations in 1991, increasing from $32.23 million to almost 
$2.47 billion by the end of the 20th century, it stagnated during the mid-1990s until after 
the 1997 meeting (see Vietnam’s exports to China and imports from China in Figures 2 
and 3).203 Following the 1997 meeting, the trade data shows that Vietnam’s imports from 
China have generally made up an increasing share of Vietnam’s total imports during 
subsequent years. Although, Vietnam’s exports to China have fluctuated in relation to its 
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total exports, since 1997 the percentage has generally increased, as well. By 2004, China 
exceeded Japan as Vietnam’s largest trade partner.204  
Increased Sino-Vietnamese economic ties were slow to produce the investments 
from China that the VCP expected, but as China’s economy grew, so did closer ties and 
Chinese support for improving Vietnam’s infrastructure.205 It took more than a year after 
normalizing relations for Vietnam to receive its first loans from China, and these only 
amounted $14 million.206 More recently, however, Chinese foreign direct investment in 
Vietnam during 2013 increased dramatically to $2.3 billion, up from $345 million during 
the previous year. That number more than tripled to $7.94 billion in 2014.207 
2. The Philippines: How Threats and Domestic Politics Led to Economic 
Ties with China 
Internal and external threats and domestic politics shaped the Philippines’ path to 
economic reform and growth, which eventually produced enduring ties with China. 
Social and political landed elite families have largely controlled Philippine domestic 
politics.208 The political environment in the Philippines during much of the 20th century 
can be characterized as elite rule over underrepresented masses, which led to political 
corruption, domestic instability, and the emergence of internal threats.209 Following 
Japanese occupation during World War II, the Philippine oligarchical government created 
an environment that unintentionally fostered domestic threats, seen in the rise of peasant 
rebellions and Islamic insurgencies. By the 1980s, Philippine domestic threats included 
the CPP with its NPA, the MNLF, and the MILF.210 By the early 1990s, ASG split from 
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the MNLF, adding to the Philippine internal threat problem.211 Protected by a U.S. 
security umbrella until 1992, Manila perceived its external threats as minimal until the 
mid-1990s, when China increased its challenges to Philippine sovereignty in the South 
China Sea.212 Although Philippine leadership recognized the need for economic growth 
to counter threats, political corruption and the concurrent rise of threats often hindered, 
but at times inspired, economic reform. Each successive political administration adjusted 
its economic policy and the Philippine path to economic growth in response to threats.213 
President Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines from 1965 through 
1986, aimed to end oligarchical political control that prompted the emergence of internal 
threats, but his administration’s corruption, cronyism, and authoritarian rule hindered 
economic reform and growth and ultimately led to the overthrow of his regime. Not only 
did Marcos fail at reforming class inequality, but the CPP/NPA and MNLF insurgencies 
he aimed to mollify only grew stronger during his term.214 As corruption and failed 
policies plagued the Marcos presidency, in February of 1986, the “People Power” 
uprising forced Marcos into exile after he tried to steal the presidential election from 
Corazon Aquino.215 Aquino emerged from the uprising as president. Civil-military 
infighting, however, plagued her administration and destabilized the government. 
Ultimately, Aquino failed to make progress with the insurgencies and did not adopt any 
significant economic reform.216  
Aquino’s former AFP chief of staff, Fidel Ramos, succeeded her in 1992. As a 
reformer, he prioritized economic growth and applied new strategies to handle internal 
threats and domestic politics. Ramos recognized four factors that connected managing the 
Philippine insurgencies with a path to economic growth: first, economic growth required 
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more domestic stability; second, the insurgencies disrupted stability; third, poverty of the 
masses fed the insurgencies; and finally, the Philippine elitist political structure fostered 
poverty. Accordingly, Ramos prioritized economic reform during his presidency.217  
China’s construction at Mischief Reef in 1995 further highlighted to Ramos the 
need for economic growth. China’s activities challenged Philippine sovereignty and 
underscored the nation’s vulnerability to external threats. As such, external security 
emerged as an additional priority for the Ramos administration. In February of 1995, 
Ramos signed the AFP Modernization Act, aimed at improving Philippine external 
defense capabilities. Fulfilling the requirements outlined in the act, however, largely 
depended on enduring economic growth, facilitated through internal stability, but lack of 
stability continued to afflict the Philippines at the end of Ramos’ term.218 Joseph Estrada, 
succeeded Ramos in 1998, but cronyism and corruption plagued his brief presidency, 
which inspired the “People Power 2” movement, ending his term in January 2001.219 
Following the Estrada administration, the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo presidency 
marked an increase in Sino-Philippine economic ties and cooperation between the two 
governments over South China Sea disputes, with some enduring results. With her 
economist background, Arroyo made economic growth a top priority.220 She adopted an 
“equi-balancing” policy between relations with Beijing and Washington, which helped 
her manage the Philippine internal threats while pursing economic growth.221 While 
rekindling security ties with Washington to manage Philippine insurgencies, Arroyo 
pursued economic ties with Beijing to grow the Philippine infrastructure and economy.222 
Beijing likely welcomed President Arroyo’s more open policies with China, since the 
CCP had been working since the mid-1990s to reassure its Southeast Asian neighbors 
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that China’s rise would be peaceful and beneficial to the region.223 Subsequently, a 
substantial increase in Sino-Philippine bilateral trade emerged during Arroyo’s term. The 
president also facilitated contracts for Chinese investment in Philippine infrastructure and 
a joint agreement for oil exploration in the South China Sea—the Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking (JMSU), which later included Vietnam.224 
President Arroyo’s equi-balancing policy correlates with enduring economic 
benefits for the Philippines, despite political corruption tainting many of her agreements 
with Beijing. As evidence of the economic benefits of Arroyo’s cooperation with China, 
bilateral Sino-Philippine trade increased from $2 billion in 1998 to $30 billion in 2007.225 
Moreover, between 2004 and 2007, President Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao 
signed several bilateral agreements for investments, including $1.6 billion of loans and 
$1 million of military finance from Beijing. By 2006, China funded high-level 
infrastructure development projects in the Philippines and became its fifth highest official 
development assistance (ODA) investor.226 China’s concessional lending to the 
Philippines expanded from $60 million in 2003 to $1.1 billion by 2007. Also in 2007, 
China ranked fourth—behind the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and 
Japan—in sources of financial support for the Philippines.227  
Manila joined the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, 
correlating to continued acceleration in Sino-Philippine trade growth witnessed since the 
beginning of Arroyo’s presidency.228 As part of the ASEAN-5 with Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand, the Philippines witnessed only limited bilateral trade with 
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China between 1980 and 1999.229 Annual trade numbers during the period never rose 
above 6 percent of Philippine imports coming from China and 3 percent of its exports 
going to China.230 Though Sino-Philippine trade grew prior to the CAFTA proposal, the 
Philippines significantly lagged its ASEAN-5 partners. The Philippines conducted just 
over $3.5 billion in total trade with China in 2001.231 The next closest ASEAN-5 country 
to the Philippines during 2001 was Indonesia, totaling just over 
$6.7 billion of trade with China.232 
Though Manila was initially hesitant to join CAFTA, Beijing incentivized 
Philippine membership with its “early harvest program” (EHP).233 China presented the 
EHP as a series of bilateral agreements with selected ASEAN countries that aimed to 
eliminate trade tariffs by 2006.234 In 2005, the Philippines accepted the EHP, and Sino-
Philippine bilateral trade relations continued to accelerate.235 
Aside from joining CAFTA, Beijing and Manila signed additional bilateral 
agreements during Arroyo’s presidency. The agreements included Chinese funded 
railway and telecommunications projects in the Philippines and a joint oil exploration 
project in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Corruption and lack of transparency in 
the Arroyo administration caused these projects to falter, but the growing economic ties 
established between the countries during the Arroyo administration endured.236  
Wary of Arroyo’s corruption scandals, her successor, President Benigno Aquino 
III, distanced himself from many of her policies, while initially still seeking cooperation 
with Beijing. Upon taking office in June 2010, however, rising tensions in the South 
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China Sea turned Sino-Philippine cooperation cold and hastened Aquino’s urgency for 
improving external defense capabilities. Nevertheless, lack of funds continued to hinder 
the administration’s external defense modernization plans.237  
Despite Arroyo’s corruption scandals and growing tensions in the South China 
Sea, Sino-Philippine bilateral trade continued to increase during Aquino’s term.238 
Although the percentage of Philippine exports to China dropped significantly—from 45 
percent to 30 percent—between 2007 and 2009, China continued to import more than 30 
percent of Philippine exports through the end of Aquino’s term (see Figure 3). By 2010, 
China had become the Philippines’ third largest trade partner and contributor of foreign 
aid, a trend that continued through 2015.239 During Aquino’s final full year in office, 
2015, Chinese statistics claim that Sino-Philippine bilateral trade reached a record 
$45.6 billion, marking a 2.7 percent growth rate. As a same year comparison, Sino-
ASEAN trade decreased 1.7 percent, while the Philippines remained one of four ASEAN 
members with positive trade growth with China. According to Philippine statistics, China 
retained its spot as the Philippines’ second largest trade partner in 2015, a position China 
reached in 2013.240 
3. Summary of Pursuit of Economic Growth 
The pursuit of economic growth led both Hanoi and Manila to pursue policies that 
led to asymmetric economic interdependence between them and Beijing. Vietnam’s 
historic struggle and early 1980s economic crisis led the VCP to seek economic growth to 
strengthen the nation and ensure regime survival. Factions within the VCP had competing 
perspectives on how to achieve economic growth. The conservative path favored ties 
with Beijing, with an air of deference, which led to growing interconnectedness between 
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the countries’ economies. Both internal and external threats inspired successive 
Philippine political administrations to seek economic growth to reduce poverty, social 
unrest, and later, vulnerability to external threats. Corruption and failure to implement 
effective economic reform hindered progress for growth, but the Philippines’ path toward 
economic prosperity led it toward closer ties with China during the Arroyo 
administration, with enduring effects.  
D. MANAGING SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES CONCURRENTLY WITH 
INCREASING TRADE TIES 
China and its two neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines, have taken efforts to 
manage South China Sea disputes concurrently with their growing trade ties. Their 
dispute management efforts can be correlated to enduring peace and, at times, 
cooperation and agreements, despite increasing tensions over South China Sea disputes. 
The asymmetric nature of the relationship has given Beijing leverage over Hanoi and 
Manila that it has attempted to use to its advantage. This section reviews the correlation 
between growing economic ties and the management of disputes. This section also 
reviews how the nature of the asymmetric interdependent relationships has provided 
Beijing leverage to manage disputes in its favor, without using military force. 
While Vietnam and the Philippines’ pursuit of economic growth may have been a 
catalyst to agreements and cooperation to manage South China Sea disputes at times, the 
resulting asymmetric interdependence became a liability to the smaller states. For 
example, while VCP conservatives have demonstrated willingness to cooperate with 
Beijing on South China Sea disputes to foster closer relations, bilateral discussions and 
negotiations have avoided contentious topics, such as overlapping claims to the Paracels, 
and focused on less controversial matters, such as the Tonkin Gulf agreement of 2000. 241 
Furthermore, Vietnamese nationalists criticized General Secretary Le Kha Phieu’s 
negotiations for the border agreements as conceding too much to Beijing.242 As for the 
Philippines, its Congress investigated the 2005 tripartite JMSU negotiated by President 
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Macapagal Arroyo, questioned the agreement’s lack of transparency, and criticized it for 
trading away Philippine security interests.243 Ultimately, the asymmetric Sino-
Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine trade relations created vulnerabilities in the smaller 
states that Beijing has attempted to use as leverage in managing South China Sea disputes 
while avoiding armed conflict. Evidence indicates that many in Vietnam and the 
Philippines have grown concerned about their countries’ economic dependence on China. 
Two case studies highlight the smaller states’ concerns and how they attempted to 
mitigate their vulnerabilities: the Sino-Vietnamese 2014 standoff over China’s HD-981 
oilrig operations and the Sino-Philippines 2012 standoff over Scarborough Shoal. 
1. Sino-Vietnamese Trade and South China Sea Disputes 
China and Vietnam have conducted bilateral engagements as an alternative to 
armed conflict to resolve disputes.244 Many of the engagements involved discussions that 
culminated in joint statements, calling for the peaceful resolution of disputes. One of the 
series of talks resulted in an enduring settlement over maritime borders and cooperation 
for oil exploration and fishing in the Tonkin Gulf. Despite periods of cooperation, 
however, Vietnam’s leadership recognized its limited ability to respond to disputes as a 
result of its economic dependence on China. Accordingly, VCP leaders moved to reduce 
the country’s dependence on its powerful neighbor following escalating tensions over 
China’s oil exploration in Vietnam’s claimed EEZ during the summer of 2014.245 
a. Agreements, Cooperation, and Asymmetric Leverage 
The Sino-Vietnamese agreements for joint oil exploration and establishing fishing 
boundaries in the Tonkin Gulf represent the ability of the two governments to cooperate 
and resolve disputes without resorting to armed conflict. In 1992, a year after normalizing 
relations, VCP and CCP leaders established a series of structured bilateral discussion to 
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manage territorial disputes.246 Subsequently, negotiations over Tonkin Gulf borders 
began in 1994.247 In 1997, the same year Chinese reformer Li Ruihuan approached the 
VCP to open Sino-Vietnamese economic relations, Hanoi and Beijing agreed to complete 
their land-border agreement by 2000.248 For nine months during 2000, the two 
governments conducted six out of the 17 total joint talks held since 1994 to urgently 
resolve the Tonkin Gulf borders. On 25 December 2000, China and Vietnam’s leaders 
signed the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and 
Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin.249 Concurrently, the states signed a Bilateral 
Agreement on Fishing Cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin and a Joint Statement on All-
Round Cooperation in the New Century, which promoted maintaining bilateral 
institutions for negotiations to resolve South China Sea disputes.250 Both governments 
ratified the fishing and maritime border agreements on 30 June 2004. Bilateral expert-
level talks expanded in January 2006 to discuss areas of cooperation beyond the Tonkin 
Gulf. During the same year, Vietnam and China signed an agreement for joint oil 
exploration in the Tonkin Gulf. In June 2013, the two states extended the agreement to 
2016 and expanded the area of exploration.251 As identified in section B of this chapter 
and indicated in Figures 2 and 3, Sino-Vietnamese economic ties generally increased 
during this period. 
In addition to the Tonkin Gulf agreements, Hanoi and Beijing made further 
agreements and joint statements of cooperation since their economies became more 
interconnected. For example, in 1995, the governments initiated bilateral, “expert-level” 
talks to institutionalize efforts for peaceful negotiations of South China Sea disputes.252 
The VCP and CCP made a Joint Declaration on 27 February 1999 in which they agreed 
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to continue the “existing negotiation mechanism on the sea issues” to achieve a long-term 
solution to resolve disputes.253 In March 1999, following VCP General Secretary Le Kha 
Phieu’s visit to China for a high-level summit meeting, the VCP and CCP leaders reached 
an agreement for “long-term, stable, future-oriented, good-neighbourly, and all-round 
cooperative relations.”254 
Some might argue that these statements and agreements have had little effect on 
the growing tensions in the South China Sea. The governments that make these 
statements, however, control the military assets required to engage in armed conflict. 
Furthermore, Beijing and Hanoi have both sought methods to manage disputes without 
resorting to military force, especially during times of growing tensions. For example, 
rising tensions between China and Vietnam beginning in 2009 spurred more frequent 
visits and measures between party leaders to deescalate tensions peacefully. The tensions 
in 2009 increased following the Chinese Zhou Jiang International Travel Agent’s 
announcement to commence tours to the Paracel Islands.255 Subsequently, between early 
2010 and mid-2011, Chinese and Vietnamese officials conducted six rounds of 
negotiations over their disputed South China Sea claims.256 Tensions continued through 
2011, triggering Hanoi to send officials to Beijing on 25 June to deescalate the situation. 
Following the meeting, both sides agreed that a key element to peace and stability resided 
in the “need to steer public opinions [sic] along the correct direction, avoiding comments 
and deeds that harm the friendship and trust of the people of the two countries.”257 In 
October 2011, the parties signed The Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the 
Settlement of Sea-Related Issues, and the first meeting of the VCP and CCP heads of 
state since 2008 occurred when General Secretary Nguyen Phu Tong visited Beijing.258  
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Furthermore, meetings between China and Vietnam’s leaders during 2011 and 
2012 led to the establishment of working groups and hotlines between government 
ministries to manage maritime disputes.259 In June of 2013, the two nations’ presidents 
visited Beijing, and there were more agreements for hotlines to manage emergent 
incidents, cooperation through working groups, and continued negotiations for dispute 
settlements.260 
The asymmetric nature of the economic interdependence between China and 
Vietnam, however, has not come without a cost to Hanoi. The VCP leadership has 
adjusted its actions in response to the country’s economic dependence on China. For 
example, as China’s growing assertiveness to control the South China Sea has threatened 
Vietnam’s resources and sovereignty, it has also threatened VCP legitimacy. As a result 
of China’s assertiveness, Vietnamese nationalists have increasingly perceived China as a 
threat, leading to excessive anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam. Due to Vietnam’s 
economic dependence on China, the threat of economic sanctions led the VCP to view 
anti-Chinese sentiment as a threat to Vietnam’s economic growth and regime survival.261 
Accordingly, VCP conservatives have quelled anti-Chinese uprisings, as seen during their 
2011 control over protests in response to China’s interference with Vietnamese South 
China Sea oil exploration, covered in Chapter II.262 
b. Case Study: HD-981 
A closer study of the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese oil exploration standoff involving 
China’s HD-981 oilrig operations reveals that Hanoi has developed growing concerns 
about Beijing’s economic leverage in managing disputes. As covered in Chapter III, the 
2014 standoff escalated on 2 May, when HD-981 deployed—with over 100 fishing boats 
and ships to form a defense perimeter around the operation—to the disputed area within 
Vietnam’s claimed EEZ. When the Vietnamese responded with their own vessels, the 
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standoff escalated, as Chinese vessels reportedly rammed and sank a Vietnamese vessel. 
While the two governments maintained diplomatic engagements in an effort to resolve 
the standoff peacefully, violent anti-Chinese protests erupted in Vietnam, targeting 
Chinese-owned industries and businesses and resulting in at least two Chinese casualties 
and the evacuation of 3,000 Chinese citizens. 
To the VCP, the incident highlighted vulnerabilities resulting from Vietnam’s 
economic dependence on China. As tensions increased, state media in China warned of 
possible enduring economic ramifications in Vietnam, and the countries’ bilateral trade 
quickly decreased.263 During a June 2014 National Assembly meeting, VCP deputy 
ministers considered ways to lessen Vietnam’s economic reliance on China as a result of 
China’s “illegally placed…oil rig in Vietnamese waters.”264 At the time, Vietnam’s 
industries relied on many materials manufactured in China—such as textiles, leather, and 
shoe products—to produce its own finished exports for external markets in countries like 
Japan, the United States, and Europe. During the assembly, Vietnam’s Minister of 
Industry and Trade Vu Huy Hoang highlighted that the country’s trade deficit with China 
has existed for several years and was a growing concern among many of Vietnam’s 
business sectors. Several industries, such as garments and textiles, had begun seeking 
material in alternate markets, including South Korea, Malaysia, India, and Thailand. 
Additionally, the government pursued finalization of Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations and other, bilateral, free trade agreements to diversify Vietnamese markets. 
Subsequently, Vietnam’s imports from China dropped from 44 to 31 percent of 
Vietnam’s total imports from 2014 to 2015, after the percentage had rapidly increased for 
more than a decade.265 In light of Vietnam’s economic dependence on China, the 2014 
HD-981 incident resulted in significant concern among VCP leaders, causing them to 
diversify the country’s economic ties.266  
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2. Sino-Philippine Trade Relations and South China Sea Disputes 
Despite increasing tensions over South China Sea disputes during the last 15 
years, the increase in Sino-Philippine trade relations correlates with a lack of armed 
conflict in the South China Sea, cooperation, and agreements for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, and at least one case when Beijing applied subtle economic leverage and 
influenced Manila’s response to increasing tensions at Scarborough Shoal.  
a. Dispute Management, Agreements, and Cooperation 
Overlapping territory and resource claims did not receive significant attention 
from Philippine leadership until the 1995 incident at Mischief Reef. At that time, internal 
threats occupied Manila’s focus. Accordingly, the Ramos administration was resigned to 
engaging ASEAN and making diplomatic protests to counter China’s actions. Ramos’ 
efforts had some positive results for maintaining stability in the South China Sea, as 
Beijing agreed to bilateral talks with Manila, and the governments issued a joint 
statement during August of 1995, vowing to resolve disputes peacefully.267 
President Arroyo’s 10 separate visits to China during her term are indicative of 
her administration’s cooperative approach toward dealing with the emerging Chinese 
threat. By comparison, her four predecessors each visited China once.268 The JMSU was 
another indication of cooperation between the governments to manage disputes. Although 
the Arroyo administration abandoned the JMSU, the governments have avoided armed 
conflict over hydrocarbons. 
Since President Arroyo increased cooperation with Beijing, the succeeding 
administration, under President Aquino, managed other disputes short of armed conflict, 
as well. As seen in Chapter II, Sino-Philippine disputes over fishing have escalated to 
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clashes involving state-operated vessels in 1998, 1999, and 2015. The 1998 and 1999 
incidents involved Philippine naval vessels, but Manila limited its use of military assets 
during the more recent escalations. Additionally, all of the clashes have deescalated short 
of armed conflict. The Scarborough Shoal standoff, which began during the Ramos 
administration, escalated again in 2012 and has remained as a standoff, but short of 
armed conflict, ever since. As with Sino-Vietnamese trade relations, Manila’s ability to 
manage South China Sea disputes underscored vulnerabilities the Philippines incurred 
with the asymmetry in Sino-Philippine economic interdependence.  
b. Case Study: Scarborough Shoal  
A closer study of the 2012 escalation of the standoff at Scarborough Shoal reveals 
the ramifications of the imbalanced Sino-Philippine trade ties on Manila. As reviewed in 
Chapter II, the standoff escalated in April 2012, when a Philippine surveillance aircraft 
detected eight Chinese fishing vessels near the shoal. Manila responded on 10 April by 
deploying the Philippine Navy flagship, BRP Gregorio Del Pilar, to confront the 
fishermen. In turn, China responded by deploying two CMS ships to the site to prevent an 
arrest.269 Reacting to international and domestic criticism for potentially escalating the 
standoff by responding with a combatant, Manila exchanged its flagship with smaller 
coast guard vessels.270 China, on the other hand, maintained the appearance of a more 
benign presence at the shoal by deploying civil law enforcement vessels, including its 
largest and most-advanced FLEC ships, which outmatched the Del Pilar.271 
Economically, the asymmetric Sino-Philippine trade relationship created 
vulnerabilities for Manila that Beijing could leverage in managing the standoff in its 
favor, while avoiding armed conflict. As tensions increased, Chinese import inspectors 
blocked Philippine bananas from entering China’s markets, claiming the fruit failed to 
                                                 
269 “Interactive Map;” Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 115. 
270 Hayton, South China Sea: Struggle for Power, 115, 196; Carlyle Thayer, “Standoff at Scarborough 
Shoal: Implications for U.S.-China Relations,” China-U.S. Focus, 9 May 2012, 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/standoff-at-scarborough-shoal-implications-for-us-china-
relations/.  
271 De Castro, “Aquino Administration’s Balancing Policy,” 6. 
 66
pass Chinese import standards.272 By 15 May, 150 containers of bananas worth 
approximately $760,000 sat ripening at the Chinese port of entry. The following day, 43 
containers of Philippine pineapple and papaya exports joined the bananas, also failing 
import inspections.273 At the time, Sino-Philippine trade had reached about $30 billion, 
and China accepted nearly 38 percent of the Philippines’ total exports.274 Additionally, 
bananas made up approximately $75 million of Philippine exports to China, which, as 
one of Manila’s top four banana markets, accepted about 25 percent of the bananas the 
Philippines exported each year, according to Philippine Trade Secretary Gregory 
Domingo. The head of the Filipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Stephen 
Antig, initially claimed that protracting the situation could risk up to 200,000 Filipino 
jobs, including pickers, growers, and workers in the supply chain.275 While, the Aquino 
administration maintained that the banana incident was a technical matter, rather than 
diplomatic over Scarborough Shoal, Secretary Domingo traveled to China on a 
diplomatic mission during peak tensions. Additionally, President Aquino, recognizing the 
Philippines’ vulnerability, provided direction to diversify the Filipino banana markets.276 
Subsequently, the Philippines’ banana exports more than doubled during 2012, even as 
Philippine exports to China compared to its total exports dropped 5 percent between 2012 
and 2013.277 
Philippine fear of Beijing’s economic leverage over the Scarborough dispute 
extended to tourism, as well. In response to Filipino protests over the incident, Beijing 
issued travel advisories, warning Chinese tourists to avoid protest sites, such as the 
Chinese consulate in Makati City. The advisories sparked concerns among Philippine 
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media and tourism companies that the standoff would result in reduced commercial air 
flights between the countries and impose a significant dent in the Philippine tourist 
market.278 Ultimately, Philippine businesses and local politicians became more 
concerned about the economic effects of increasing tensions in the South China Sea.279 
After more than two months of tensions over the Scarborough Shoal incident, 
concurrent with fears of the economic ramifications in Manila, tensions finally 
deescalated, with Beijing gaining an advantage at the shoal. Amid Chinese protests, 
Manila almost immediately replaced its combatant at the shoal with smaller coast guard 
vessels, while Beijing responded with more capable ships. By the end of May, China was 
accepting Philippine bananas again, but Philippine fears of economic sanctions 
remained.280 Following negotiations, the standoff deescalated on 18 June with an 
understanding that both sides would withdraw from the shoal. Only the Philippines fully 
complied, however, as Beijing left seven law enforcement vessels at the feature.281 In 
August, the Chinese cordoned the opening to the shoal, and six months later, three 
Chinese government vessels remained to control access.282 In January 2013, Manila 
resigned to less risky means of challenging China’s South China Sea sovereignty claims 
by filing its case through the ICJ, which Beijing has merely protested as unlawful and 
largely ignored.283 Despite the dispute, by October 2013, Secretary Domingo was 
claiming that China may soon surpass the United States and Japan as the Philippines’ 
largest export market.284 As of 2015, the Chinese continued to deploy coast guard ships 
to prevent other nations’ vessels from entering the shoal.285 In effect, China’s subtle, 
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application of economic pressure gave it an advantage in claiming sovereignty over 
Scarborough Shoal. 
3. Summary of Trade Relations and South China Sea Disputes 
Since Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Philippine trade relations have increased, China, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines have worked to manage South China Sea disputes, while 
avoiding armed conflict, despite growing tensions. As seen in Chapter II, all three 
countries have limited their use of military assets in response to standoffs. Vietnam and 
China have favored bilateral discussions, joint statements and agreements. To a lesser 
extent, the Philippines and China have also engaged in discussions and have made joint 
statements and agreements. The recent standoffs over HD-981 and Scarborough Shoal 
emphasized to the smaller countries’ governments the vulnerabilities in their asymmetric 
economic interdependence with China. The Vietnamese and the Philippine governments 
have taken measures to adjust accordingly, but their economic ties to China have limited 
their options to non-provoking measures, regardless. 
E. BEIJING DEPENDS ON PEACE AND STABILITY, TOO 
Some might argue that the asymmetric nature of the Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-
Philippine economic relationships indicates that the states are not economically 
interdependent. After all, China does not depend on the smaller countries for economic 
prosperity, and therefore, one might argue that little is preventing Beijing from using its 
growing military might to take control of South China Sea territory and resources. As 
identified in Chapter I, however, economic interdependence does not have to be 
symmetric. It only requires interconnected economies, where there will be significant 
costly effects for both sides if they oppose each other in armed conflict. Since China 
depends on the flow of raw materials and manufactured resources through the South 
China Sea, any armed conflict there would have significant costly effects on its economic 
growth. With limited alternatives for China’s flow of imports and exports, Beijing 
arguably depends on stability in the South China Sea more than its neighbors, as Vietnam 
and the Philippines have, and can continue to, pursued other options for economic 
growth. Furthermore, with China’s largest trade partner, the United States, in a Mutual 
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Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines, a Sino-Philippine armed conflict would 
likely have significant negative ramifications for Sino-American trade relations. Thus, 
Beijing depends on peace and stability in the South China Sea.  
With so much at stake for China with respect to South China Sea stability, it may 
not be surprising that China aims to control the body of water on its terms. It is also not 
surprising that Beijing has actively sought means to de-escalate standoffs, such as by 
using CMS, FLEC, and coast guard vessels, rather than combatants, to respond to 
standoffs, escalations, and clashes. Beijing’s consolidation of its multiple maritime 
organizations in 2013 was likely another effort to exert more centralized control over its 
maritime law enforcement assets to avoid escalation of disputes. Beijing depends on 
peace in the South China Sea for its economic prosperity at least as much as its 
neighbors. Thus, there exists an economic interdependent relationship that deters armed 
conflict between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. 
F. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE CONCLUSION 
As Vietnam and the Philippines began seeking economic growth through closer 
ties with Beijing, they have sought cooperation and managed South China Sea disputes 
short of armed conflict, despite growing tensions. Both of the smaller countries have 
increased their interconnectedness with China’s economy, albeit with asymmetric results. 
As the more powerful member in the economic relationship, China has used its position 
to influence decisions in Manila and Hanoi. Regardless, the growing economic ties in the 
region not only correlate to relative peace between states during contentious periods, but 
also contributed to avoiding armed conflict.  
Since China and Vietnam normalized relations in 1991, the growing 
interconnectedness of their economies not only correlates to a lack of armed conflict over 
South China Sea disputes, but also correlates to increases in meetings, working groups, 
agreements, hotlines, and joint statements aimed at deescalating and managing disputes 
peacefully. When tensions have risen, meetings have increased, indicating that both sides 
are seeking ways to avoid armed conflict. Additionally, a loss of 15 percent of Vietnam’s 
export market as a result of armed conflict or Chinese sanctions would likely have an 
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immediate significant impact on Vietnam’s economy, thus presenting cooperation over 
disputes as a more attractive option. 
For Sino-Philippine relations, economic ties developed later but had similar 
effects. Bilateral agreements and statements to settle South China Sea disputes began in 
1995, when China emerged as an increasing external threat to Philippine sovereignty. 
During the Arroyo administration, the economic ties grew more rapidly, although they 
were tainted by corruption, secrecy, and lack of transparency. Regardless, the economic 
benefits of Sino-Philippine economic ties continued to benefit the Philippines through 
2015. When South China Sea tensions have escalated, however, so has the concern 
among Filipino business owners, as a loss of one third of the Philippine export market, 
resulting from armed conflict or Chinese economic sanctions, would have a significant 
immediate impact on the Philippine economy. 
Vietnam and the Philippines’ pursuit of economic growth for national strength led 
to asymmetric economic interdependence with China. Such an asymmetric relationship 
may lead Vietnam and the Philippines to avoid provoking their powerful neighbor for 
fear of negative economic ramifications. Hanoi and Manila have realized they cannot 
compete with China militarily. Their leaders, recognizing the benefits of being good 
neighbors for peace, stability, and strength, understand they must avoid excessively 
provoking China. As such, forming economic ties provides important incentives to the 
smaller states for avoiding conflict. Beijing depends on peace in the region for economic 
prosperity as well. Vietnam and the Philippines have responded to China’s aggressive 
actions by seeking alternatives for economic growth, thus giving them more options to 
respond to China’s assertiveness. Beijing should take heed and foster its relationships 
with its neighbors to strengthen ties and encourage a stable region. As Mark Beeson 
states, “We must hope that policymakers on both sides remember that economic 
interdependence is a critically important, easily damaged part of overall national 
security.”286 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has reviewed the security and economic environments between China, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines as they relate to the countries’ overlapping territorial and 
resource claims in the South China Sea. This chapter draws conclusions from this review, 
identifies other factors not addressed in this study that likely contribute to stability in the 
South China Sea, recommends further research to address these factors, and raises potential 
policy recommendations based on these conclusions. 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSION 
This thesis derives three overarching conclusions from the evidence covered in 
Chapters II and III: first, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have not demonstrated an 
increasing trend toward armed conflict for nearly three decades; second, the states have 
also not demonstrated an increasing trend toward cooperation; and finally, asymmetric 
economic interdependence has contributed to the lack of armed conflict in the South 
China Sea since 1988 but has also imposed a cost on the smaller states.  
When China, Vietnam, and the Philippines identified common objectives of 
economic prosperity for national strength, they tended to cooperate, and economic 
interdependence took root, with enduring effects. When China’s assertiveness posed a 
threat, though, the smaller states’ realist reactions emerged and they attempted to balance 
against China and diversify their markets to alleviate their dependence on their powerful 
neighbor. All three continued to manage disputes short of armed conflict, but Beijing 
maintained the upper hand. 
1. Increasing Tensions without an Increasing Trend for Armed Conflict 
Although tensions over disputes between the states have increased during the last 
three decades, armed conflict over South China Sea territories and resources between the 
states has only occurred once, in 1988. Moreover, each country has actively sought ways to 
manage and deescalate standoffs and clashes short of armed conflict. For example, as 
tensions have continued to increase over the years, each country has limited its use of 
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military assets to respond to engagements and standoffs in the South China Sea to reduce 
the likelihood of escalation. China has shifted responses to its less adversarial, albeit very 
capable, CMS, FLEC, coast guard, and other state-owned, yet non-military, vessels. In 
2012, the Philippines quickly withdrew its most capable combatant from Scarborough 
Shoal after receiving criticism for escalating the conflict by deploying a naval vessel. Since 
then, the Philippines has limited the use of its navy to respond to disputes and generally 
acquiesced to Beijing. In effect, Manila has maintained stability but sacrificed territories 
that it continues to claim.  
Additionally, the smaller states’ limited balancing efforts have not produced 
excessively destabilizing results. While Vietnam and the Philippines have made efforts to 
balance against Chinese assertiveness through self-strengthening, the relative size of the 
smaller countries’ economies significantly limit their self-strengthening efforts. External 
balancing by Vietnam and the Philippines has produced limited results, as well. Vietnam 
has been concerned about upsetting relations with Beijing by pursuing stronger security ties 
with China’s potential competitors. Moreover, the Philippines’ closest security partner, the 
United States, has strong economic ties with China, which likely constrains Manila’s 
actions. While Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines may have a limited ability to 
throw a small military punch at China, they have not been able to compete with China’s 
military and maritime capabilities. As such, the smaller states have resigned to responding 
with diplomatic pressure, protests through multilateral institutions like ASEAN and the 
United Nations, and filing cases through international legal institutions, like the ICJ.  
2. Increasing Economic Interdependence without an Increasing Trend 
for Cooperation 
While the states have become more economically interdependent since 1988, they 
have only demonstrated periodic episodes of cooperation to settle their South China Sea 
disputes. Vietnam and China have cooperated more often and with more enduring results 
than the Philippines and China. For example, as Hanoi and Beijing pursued stronger 
economic ties during the late 1990s, they established enduring agreements over Tonkin 
Gulf borders and fishing. The states have also agreed to joint oil exploration in the 
Tonkin Gulf and expanded the agreement and search area through 2016. As tensions 
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between Hanoi and Beijing increased over disputes since 2009, the CCP and VCP also 
increased diplomatic engagements and established measures to manage emergent crises, 
such as working groups and hotlines between state ministries. Likewise, as Manila 
pursued stronger economic ties with China during the President Arroyo administration in 
the late 1990s, the two governments cooperated, with Vietnam, for the JMSU and made 
joint statements and agreements for the peaceful settlement of disputes. To be sure, the 
states abandoned the JMSU and tensions have continued to increase but have been 
managed short of armed conflict. 
3. The Stabilizing Benefits of Economic Interdependence 
Economic interdependence between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines has 
contributed to stability in the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines’ political 
leaders have recognized the benefits of economic prosperity for building stronger, more 
stable states, and ensuring the legitimacy and survival of their respective governing 
parties. As such, they turned toward the region’s largest economy, China, to establish 
economic ties. Once the nations realized the benefits of economic growth, they resisted 
actions that jeopardized that growth. Moreover, the asymmetric nature of their trade 
relations with China limited Vietnam and the Philippines’ options while providing 
Beijing leverage to manage disputes without using military force. 
Economic interdependence between China and its neighbors, Vietnam and the 
Philippines, correlates to the relative peace in the South China Sea since 1988 as well as 
periods of cooperation to settle disputes. Additionally, during times of increasing 
tensions, China used the threat of economic consequences, in lieu of military force, as 
leverage in managing its neighbors’ actions. For example, when tensions increased over 
China’s deployment of HD-981 in Vietnam’s EEZ in 2014, the threat of economic 
sanctions underscored the vulnerabilities in Vietnam’s dependence on economic ties with 
China. Furthermore, when tensions increased during 2012 over Scarborough Shoal, 
China’s rejection of Philippine banana imports and issuance of travel advisories caused 
concern among Philippine business owners. Although cooperation has been limited 
between the smaller states and China thus far, for countries eager for economic growth, 
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such incidents may cause influential business owners to pressure their governments 
toward managing disputes through cooperation.  
B. THE UNITED STATES: A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR NOT FULLY 
ADDRESSED 
This thesis does not fully address the significance of the United States in the 
Southeast Asian economic and security environments and how it affects stability in the 
South China Sea. To isolate factors to relations between China, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines, this thesis intentionally limits its scope to these three countries and only 
briefly mentions the United States where its influence is too large to ignore, such as the 
MDT and EDCA with the Philippines and U.S. economic ties with China. It is recognized 
that the United States plays a significant role in the relationships between these states. 
China and the United States have interconnected economies, the two largest economies in 
the world. The United States has the world’s largest defense budget and largest and most 
capable navy. Given the United States’ economic ties with China and economic and 
security ties with the Philippines, Washington has significant national interests in 
maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. Moreover, Washington likely has 
leverage with both Beijing and the Philippines to influence their actions and responses to 
South China Sea disputes. The impact of this leverage is not covered in this thesis. 
C. RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is recommended that future research on conflict and cooperation between China, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines focus on three areas: the influence of the United States on 
dispute management, impact of the recent Hague ruling, and future occurrences of conflict 
and cooperation between China and its neighbors, to include other states with similar 
disputes. 
As previously discussed, this thesis intentionally omits the influence that the 
United States has on regional relations regarding South China Sea disputes. Further 
research on the U.S. role in regional stability could help determine whether or not 
Washington should increase or decrease its involvement in disputes. Specifically, 
research could look at economic interdependence between the United States and each of 
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the countries to determine what sort of destabilizing behavior Washington can deter 
through economic leverage. Additionally, researching whether or not Washington 
balances security ties with Manila and economic ties with China would be useful in 
determining the U.S. role in regional stability. For example, has Washington denied 
military support to Manila during times of increasing tensions with China, but then 
cautioned Beijing on possible economic ramifications of its assertive actions?  
In July 2016, toward the end of the research for this thesis, the United Nations 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) published its ruling on the Philippine case against 
China regarding the two countries’ overlapping South China Sea claims. The impact of the 
ruling on the regional security environment will be an important indicator of regional 
stability, as it provides legal grounds for Manila to challenge the status quo over territorial 
standoffs in the South China Sea. During the course of arbitration, China refused to 
acknowledge the case’s legitimacy and vowed to ignore the outcome. Subsequently, the 
PCA ruled in favor of the Philippines, as it was the only side that presented a legitimate 
claim. Since the Philippine case is used in this thesis as an example of a measure of 
managing disputes while avoiding armed conflict, it will be interesting to see if Manila uses 
the ruling to destabilize the status quo or if Beijing challenges the ruling with a 
destabilizing response. At the time of completion of this thesis, Beijing had not responded 
with notable action, and both sides have essentially maintained the status quo.287 
Over the next ten years, research should reveal more data about how economic 
interdependence has contributed to avoiding armed conflict in the South China Sea. This 
thesis only covers approximately three decades of economic growth between three 
countries with overlapping South China Sea claims. As the populations, economies, and 
influence of South China Sea states continue to grow, their overlapping claims, unless 
resolved, are likely to result in increasing engagements and tensions and, potentially, 
more clashes and standoffs. If the states’ economies continue to grow interconnected, it 
will be important to see if they can continue to manage unresolved disputes, while 
avoiding armed conflict. 
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D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the conclusions in this thesis, three policy recommendations should be 
considered: promoting diversified economic ties between developing states; promoting 
strengthening measures, such as the modernization of developing maritime states’ security 
capabilities and strengthening external security ties; and highlighting to state leadership the 
counter-productive ramifications of destabilizing actions in the South China Sea. A state’s 
economic prosperity is important to its stability, as economic growth allows a state to 
provide public goods for its population and gives it the means to strengthen against internal 
and external threats. Additionally, economic ties between states help to increase economic 
prosperity and stability within a region. Since the early- to mid-1990s, Vietnam and the 
Philippines actively pursued economic growth for domestic stability and national strength. 
With China’s powerful economy and geographic proximity, it has been an attractive 
economic partner for Vietnam and the Philippines. During Hanoi and Manila’s pursuit of 
closer economic ties with China, both states became more amenable to cooperate with 
Beijing to manage their South China Sea disputes. Vietnam and China’s cooperation 
produced enduring agreements and methods to manage disputes, and their economic 
interconnectedness has continued to grow, albeit asymmetrically. Although the Philippines 
and China’s cooperation did not produce enduring agreements, their economic 
interconnectedness also continued to grow. The asymmetric nature of the ensuing 
economic interdependence between the states, however, gave Beijing leverage over its 
smaller neighbors in managing disputes. Therefore, it is recommended that policymakers 
promote the establishment of diverse economic ties between developing states within a 
region to foster economic growth, cooperation, and stability. Diversifying trade partners 
will help alleviate the potential for a single state gaining leverage over its neighbors. 
Promoting extra-regional economic ties will further mitigate state dependence on a regional 
power, while broadening their opportunities for economic growth. 
Policymakers should not understate the value of a nation’s ability to respond 
responsibly and with strength against external threats. Policymakers should promote 
modernizing smaller states’ maritime capabilities and strengthening security ties with 
responsible state actors that share common regional interests. China persists in its claims to 
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most of the South China Sea and continues construction on disputed features. Without 
assets that provide Vietnam and the Philippines maritime domain awareness, their 
governments may be caught off guard, as was Vietnam in 1988 and the Philippines 1995, 
when China laid claim to and began constructing outposts on two separate occasions in the 
Spratlys. It is difficult for the smaller states to respond without awareness of China’s 
activities. Early awareness will give the countries more response options than diplomatic 
protests after the fact and help deter China’s destabilizing activities. Further, Beijing cannot 
ignore the threat of a military response from the smaller states, especially if backed by a 
strong, responsible security partner, as conflict in the South China Sea would severely 
impact China’s economy. If Vietnam and the Philippines do not invest in maritime 
capabilities to improve their domain awareness and pose a credible threat to China’s 
assertive actions, they will effectively forfeit their claims to South China Sea territory and 
much of its resources. To modernize and strengthen their maritime capabilities, however, 
requires persistent economic growth—yet another reason for the states to establish globally 
diverse economic ties. 
Finally, policymakers should highlight to state leaders how aggressive actions in 
the South China Sea have been counter-productive. With China’s diplomatic and economic 
actions during the late 1990s and early 2000s, it began to reassure its neighbors that its 
intensions were benign and its growth could be beneficial to regional stability. Toward the 
end of the first decade of the 2000s, China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China 
Sea caused Vietnam and the Philippines to respond and balance against Beijing. The two 
smaller countries’ economic dependence on China limited their response options, causing 
them to diversify their security and economic ties. In summary, when China has acted 
responsibly, Vietnam and the Philippines were prone to cooperate, contributing to a 
stronger, more stable region, and when China acted aggressively, Beijing only pushed 
Hanoi and Manila to diversify their markets and seek security ties elsewhere, while the 
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